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Introduction

The Market and the
Community
Lessons from California's
Drought Water Bank
by Brian E. Gray*

Beginning in the early 1980s. the California Legislature enacted
a series of laws that were designed to facilitate and to promote
the voluntary transfer of water. In creating a 'limited free market' for water, the Legislature recognized that it would be necessary to consider alternatives to new engineering projects to
supply the state's burgeoning demand for water. Foremost
among these alternatives was the strategy of encouraging existing water users to conserve water and to make the fruits of the
conservation available fdr some other use. Water transfers were
a central feature of this strategy, because the market both
would offer price incentives for voluntary conservation and
would present existing users with the opportunity costs of continuing their current, perhaps less than efficient, water use
practices.)
Snowpack and precipitation were abundant during the
early 1980s In all areas from which California obtains its surface
water. Consequently. few users transferred water pursuant to
the new transfer laws. As the 1980s progressed, however,
California fell into one of the most severe droughts in the
state's recorded history, and several large transfers of conserved and surplus water took place3 By the end of the decade.
the cumulative effects of the drought included acute supply
shortages throughout the state and a panoply of environmental
problems. 3 in response. Governor Pete Wilson declared a state-

wide %,atersupply emergency in February 1991 and ordered the
Department of Water Resources to create an Emergency
Drought Water Bank. The Water Bank. which operated for two
years. represents the first significant test of California's modem
water transfer laws.
This article analyzes the legal issues associated with the
transfer of water from users In Yolo and Solano Counties to the
1991 Water Bank 4 The analysis is based in large part on interviews with a number of the participants in. and representatives
* Associate Academic Dean and Professor of Law. Un'erslty of California.
Hastings College of the Law ID. 1979 Unversity of California at Berkeley. BA.
1976. Pomona College
I would like to thank wendy Lou Manley for her excellent assistance In the
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of groups affected by these transfers. From these interviews, six important questions emerged:
(1) Were the existing water transfer laws, which
authorize the transfer of surplus water and water
made available as a result of conservation, adequate to facilitate the transfer of water to the
Water Bank?
(2) Why did the State Water Resources Control
Board have so little jurisdiction over the transfers
to the Water Bank, and did the Board's limited
role conform to the requirements of California
law?
(3) Did the Department of Water Resources' acquisition of the benefits of water held pursuant to
riparian rights unlawfully circumvent the place-ofuse limitations of the riparian system?
(4) Should the transfers of the "base supplies"
held by the Central Valley Project "water rights
settlement" contractors have been subject to the
transfer jurisdiction of the State Water Resources
Control Board?
(5) Did the transfers of surface water made available by the transferor's decision to use groundwater as a replacement source of supply comply with
the surface water transfer laws and the California
Water Code's protections of counties in which
groundwater originates?
(6) Did the transfer process established by the
Department of Water Resources (a) protect the
interests of the local areas from which water was
exported and (b) provide an adequate forum for
consideration of potential environmental effects
of the transfers?
These questions overlap one another in many significant respects. For example, the limited role played by
the State Water Resources Control Board (hereinafter
"the Board") was largely the result of the Department
of Water Resources' (hereinafter "DWR") legal characterization of the surface water that was transferred to
the Water Bank. And, one consequence of the Board's
By the time the study was completed, final data from the 1992 Water
Bank were not available. See supra note *. Second, a principal topic of the
article is the effects of water transfers on third-party Interests in the
areas from which water was conserved and transferred to the Water
Bank. The 1991 Water Bank included water made available from land fallowing, while the 1992 Water Bank did not. Consequently, the 1991
transfers provided more useful data for analyzing the relationship
between water transfers and local economic, hydrologic, and environmental Interests affected by the transfers. The article does compare the
1991 and 1992 operations where appropriate, particularly In Part III
which evaluates changes In law and policy that have resulted from the
state's experience In administering the 1991 Water Bank. For more information on the 1992 Water Bank. see CALIFORNIA
DEPAiENT OF WATER
REsouRces, THE 1992 DROUGHT
WATERBANr (1993).
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restricted jurisdiction was the elimination of existing
legal protections for third-party interests and for counties in which groundwater originates. Thus, the analysis of these questions will dovetail, and the answers to
any one question inevitably will shape the answers to
the others.
Along with the legal analysis, I will discuss
whether the actions taken by the participating agencies, though lawful (or at least legally justifiable), represent salutary public policy. For example, the characterization of certain transfers in a way that removed
them from the regulatory jurisdiction of the Board
undoubtedly made it easier for the Department of
Water Resources to acquire water for distribution to
areas of the state that were suffering from severe
shortages. But is it proper for agencies with paramount
authority over California's water resources to circumvent the statutory protections established by the
Legislature for the protection of groundwater reserves,
fish and wildlife, instream flows, and the Interests of
areas-of-origin? Thus, in addition to evaluating the
legality of actions that have long since transpired, I will
suggest how California's water transfer laws should be
changed to incorporate the positive lessons of the
1991 Water Bank and to redress the actions that were
legally problematic or which inappropriately favored
some of the competing interests over others.
1. A Brief Overview of the 1991 Water Bank
A.The Cumulative Effects of the Drought
The 1991 Water Bank was created in response to
an impending water supply emergency in many areas
of California caused by four consecutive years of
drought. Following a period of relative abundance during the early 1980s, capped by an officially "wet" year in
1986, California began an extended drought, Water
years 1987 and 1988 were designated as "critical."
Conditions improved slightly in 1989, which as a result
of unusually high March precipitation in the Sierra
Nevada ended up as merely a "dry" ydar. In water years
1990 and 1991, however, precipitation and runoff
returned again to "critical" levels and the cumulative
effects of the drought began to strain both the econo6
my and environment of the state.
In February 1991, storage in California's 155
5 Statewide precipitation during the 1986 water year (October I,
1985, through September 30. 19861 was 128 percent of average and
runoff exceeded the historical average by 40 percent The Sacramento
River Index (which estimates the unimpaired runoff In the Sacramento
River system above the city of Red Bluff, the flow of water from the
Feather River In Oroville Reservoir, the unimpaired flow of the Yuba
River at the town of Smartville. and the flow of the American River Into
Folsom Reservoir) was 25.7 million acre-feet or 68 million acre-feet
greater than its fifty year average to that date In addition to these annual supplies, on October I, 1986, reservoir storage stood at 119 percent of
average. CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT
OF WATERREsouRCES, CALIFORNIA'S
CONTINUING
DROUGHT
1987-1991L A SuMoARY OFIMPACTS
ANDCONDITIONs
AS
OF DEcE BER1, 1991. at 2 (1991) Ihereinafter 1991 DWR REPomTI.
6. Id.
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largest reservoirs had dropped to 54 percent of average. the lowest level since the 1976-1977 drought and
the second lowest level since the state's major water
supply facilities were constructed. 7 Storage in the
State Water Project (hereinafter 'SWP") was at an alltime low, standing at 884.000 acre-feet or only 18 percent of capacity. 8 The Department of Water Resources
estimated on February I that inflow to Oroville
Reservoir for the 1991 water year would be only 1.54
million acre-feet, or 32 percent of historical average. 9
Based on these data, the Department announced on
February 4 that it would deliver only 10 percent of the
water requested by State Water Project contractors for
municipal and industrial supply and n0 project water
to agricultural users.' 0
Central Valley Project (hereinafter 'CVP") water
users faced only slightly less dire prospects. CVP storage was 2 million acre-feet below February 1990 levels
and stood at 3.8 million acre-feet or 51 percent of historical average." The Bureau of Reclamation estimated that the runoff into CVP reservoirs would be 1.3 million acre-feet less than in water year 1990.12 In
response to these forecasts, the Bureau announced in
February 1991 that deliveries to urban and agricultural
users would receive only 25 percent of normal contract
supplies, and other CVP contractors that have special
status because of their pre-project water rights--the
Sacramento
River Water
Rights Settlement
Contractors and the San Joaquin River Exchange
Contractors-would receive 75 percent of their con3
tract entitlements.
Regional water supply agencies were similarly
affected by the continuing drought. The Hetch Hetchy
Project, which supplies water to San Francisco and
thirty other cities and water agencies on the San
Francisco Peninsula, had only 400.000 acre-feet of
stored water on February 1. compared with normal
storage of one million acre-feet. Snowpack in the
Tuolumne River watershed above Hetch Hetchy
7. C/iFoRNLA DFPAmiENr OF WATER
RESoURCES.
THE 1991 DRouGHT
(1992) Ihereinafter 1992 DWR RPoRTI.

WATERBANK1

8. STATEOF C uromm. REPORTOF THEGE'mOR'S DRouoHT Acno.i
T , 8 (1991) [hereinafter DAT REPoRTl. The Department of Water
Resources also had access to 250.000 acre-feet of water In groundwater
conservation storage Id
9. ld
20. 1992 DWR REPORT.
supra note 7. at I. The only exception was for
contractors in the Feather River service area, who have water rights settlement agreements with the state that recognize their pre-prolect water
rights. DWR announced that these users would receive 50 percent of
their normal contract supplies Id
1I. DAT REPORT.
supra note 8. at 9
12. Id
13. 2992 DWR REPor. supra note 7. at I Interestingly. within the
Friant Unit of the CVP. deliveries to Class I contractors were not reduced
at all. although no water was available for Class II uses 1991 DWR
REPORT.
supra note 5. at 19
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Reservoir was virtually nonexistent and Iplrospects
for additional inflow Iwerel not promising.' 4 As a
result of the projected supply deficiency, the San
Francisco Water Department imposed mandatory
water rationing, requiring its wholesale and retail customers to reduce consumption by 25 percent from
1986 levels."5 In Southern California. the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power projected that it
would be allowed to take only 130.000 acre-feet from
the Owens Valley and Mono Basin. approximately 25
percent of norinal exports. 16 To compensate for the
supply deficiency. Los Angeles proposed to make full
use (100.000 acre-feet) of its groundwater rights in the
Los Angeles basin, imposed 10 percent water
rationing, and increased its requests forwater from the
Metropolitan Water District. 7
By 1991. most agricultural users with access to
groundwater had increased their pumping to compensate for the shortages In surface water supplies. 8 The
number of new wells drilled rose to an all-time high of
24.000 in 1990. and significant groundwater overdraft
was reported throughout the eastern San loaquin
Valley and in the Tulare Basin.' 9 According to the
Department of Water Resources. groundwater depletion in these areas from 1987 through 1991 exceeded
II million acre-feet.20There also were reports of subsidence in both areas, and overdraft-induced groundwater pollution problems were found in Kings and Kern
Counties.2' By February 1991. the state predicted that
a significant number of wells would go dry by the end
of the year along the North Coast. in the eastern Sierra
Nevada. and in the Central Valley foothills.22
Despite the increased use of groundwater, substantial shortages existed in most regions of the state.
The agricultural areas expected to be most adversely
affected were -the Central Coast. the west side of the
Southern San Joaquin Valley. and western Yolo
County." 3 Following the announcement of reductions
in SWP and CVP deliveries, there were reports that
16 U at 12I
17 LdAlthough at that trr .e etropolitan Water Districts IhereInafter
"MD"Iproected supply from the SWP was only 10 percent of
normal. se svra text accompanying note 10. at 4 The Secretar of the
Interior had Informed MWID that It would be receiving a nearly normal
supply from the Boulder Canyon Proect The Seven-Party Agreement
apportioning Co!orado River Water among the California recipients provides that MWD's maximum annual entitlement at fourth and fifth priodties Is 1.154.40 acre-feeL CAws, D- .
r WATERRFcU RcEs.
Cv=-cerr% WAlrm Lco=G TO m Furu-.7, But±En 160-87. 28 (1937).
Despite three years of drought In the Co!orado River basin, accumulated storage In the sysem allorwed the Secreta y to promise deliveries of
at least 4.06.000 acre-feet to all California users. Including 1.024.00
acre-feet to MWD DAT REpaST.
supra note 8. at 12
18 1992 DWR Iru

. supra
note 7. at 16

19 Id at 18
20 1991 MWRRuv-r. sura note 5.at 16
21 Id

14. DAT REPORT.
supra note 8. at 9

22 DAT RscrT. supra
note 8. at 17-19

15 Id

23 Id at 15
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more than one million acres of farmland would be
without surface water.24 The state predicted that "over
100,000 acres of trees and vines in the southern San
.unless enough
Joaquin Valley.. .will be endangered..
25
water is transferred to save them."

A number of municipal water supply agencies had
adopted mandatory water rationing programs. These
agencies included the Marin Municipal Water District,
the San Francisco Water Department, the Santa Clara
Valley Water District, the City of Santa Barbara, and
the City of Los Angeles. 26 Most other major urban
water agencies had either called for voluntary reductions in consumption or were considering mandatory
rationing. 27 The Metropolitan Water District adopted a
price incentive system that was designed to induce its
member agencies to reduce demand by 31 percent on
a system-wide basis.

ously low levels." 32 As a result of the diminished ripar-

ian habitat, fish and wildlife throughout California
were "undergoing severe stress."33 A variety of fish
species were particularly vulnerable. For example, the
1990 fall run of Chinook salmon returning to the
Sacramento River numbered about 15,000, which was
the lowest recorded population.3 4 The 1991 Chinook
salmon winter run-which is listed as a 'threatened"
24. Carl Ingram & Maria La Ganga, U.S. \Vaterfor State Farmers is Cut
by 75 percent, LA. TiEs (quoting Jason Peltier, Manager. CVP Water
Assn.), Feb. 15, 1991, at 3, 36.
25. DAT REPORT. supra note 8, at 14.
27. Id.
28. Id,at 18.
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id,
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species under the Endangered Species Act-was even
worse. Only 191 adults returned to spawn, down from
1
441 in 1990 and approximately 20,000 In 198 .35
Striped bass may have suffered the most dramatic
declines.3 6 The adult population of striped bass also
reached an all-time low in 1991 of 515,000.7
In addition, the drought had contributed to the
loss of about one-third of the timber in the Sierra
Nevada, and tree mortality statewide stood at 8 billion
board feet, approximately two and one-half times the
normal amount38 Fuel and fire conditions were at hazardous levels, and drought-weakened forests were
highly susceptible to insect infestation.3 9 The state
also reported that "Injatural wetlands have dried up
and managed wetlands will receive only very limited
allocations for 1991."40

28

Cities served by the SWP and the CVP were "concerned about severe water reductions."29 These included towns in Shasta County, the San Juan Suburban
Water District in Sacramento County, Yuba City, cities
in southern Alameda and Santa Clara Counties served
by the South Bay Aqueduct and San Felipe Project, and
cities in Solano County, such as Benicia and Vallejo,
which depend on water from the North Bay Aqueduct
for virtually their entire water supply.30 And, as of
February 15, 1991, ten counties-Mendocino, Sonoma,
Marin, Glenn, Colusa, Sutter, Yuba, Madera, Tulare,
and Santa Barbara-had declared water shortage
31
emergencies.
The drought also had adverse consequences for
fish, wildlife, riparian vegetation, aquatic habitat, wetlands, and a variety of other natural resources, as well.
The state reported in February 1991 that "Islubstantial
reductions in stream flow requirements below dams
have been in effect for the past four years," and
"Isltreams dependent on unregulated flow are at seri-

26. Id.at 16.
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B. Creation of the Water Bank
In response to these problems, Governor Wilson
issued an executive order on February 1, 1991, which
created a "Drought Action Team" comprised of the
Secretary of the California Resources Agency and the
41
directors of various other state and federal agencles.
The Governor directed the group to coordinate the
state's response to the drought and to recommend a
course of action to mitigate its predicted effects on
domestic water supply, agriculture, and the environment during the upcoming year. On February 15th, the
Drought Action Team issued its first report, recommending among other actions that the Department of
Water Resources establish either a clearinghouse to
facilitate the transfer of water between willing buyers
and sellers or a "Water Bank" through which the
Department itself would purchase water for resale to
42
areas of California suffering from supply shortages.
The Governor chose the latter alternative and created the 1991 Drought Water Bank. According to the
Drought Action Team, the Water Bank would, "in effect,
create a pool of available water. This would then be
made available for urban agencies with critical needs,
for critical agricultural needs, fish and wildlife and for
carryover storage for next year."43 At the outset, It was
recognized that "Igliven the nature and extent of the
drought, there are only a few areas that may have water
to sell."" The Drought Action Team noted that sellers
34. 1991 DWR RePoRT. supra note 5, at 31.
35. Id.at 31. 33.
36. Id.at 32.
37. Id.
supra note 8, at 33.
38. DAT REPORT,
39. Id.
40. Id.at 16.
41. Governor of California. Exec. Order No. W-3.91 (1991). see DAT
REPort. supra note 8, at Iv.

31. Id. at 20-21.

42. DAT REPORT. supra note 8, at 28.

32, Id. at 16.

43. Id.

33. Id.

44. Id.
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would have to be -fairly compensated for sharing available resources" and would require assurances that participation in the Water Bank would not jeopardize their
water rights. 4' Two alternative means of acquiring
water were proposed:
One would involve simply paying a farmer for
his water which would result in fallowing of
land this year. The other is to pay a farmer to
switch from stream diversion to the use of
groundwater. In either case, the water would
be made available for immediate sale and
use or held in Oroville. Clair Engle. or Shasta
reservoirlsl for sale at a later date. 6
The Drought Action Team emphasized that time was of
the essence. 'Potential sellers are largely Central
Valley farmers who are now making crop decisions:
potential buyers are cities and farmers who need to
make immediate decisions to cope with severely limited water supplies."47 Accordingly. the State Water
Resources Control Board promised to expedite consideration of all petitions to engage in a temporary
48
transfer of water to the Bank.
C.Operations of the 1991 Water Bank
Immediately following the Drought Action Team's
report, the Department of Water Resources created a
"Water Purchase Committee" comprised of representatives of potential buyers and sellers. The Committee's
tasks were to negotiate the terms of a model contract
for water bank transfers, to establish a uniform price
for the water acquired by the Bank. and to estimate the
amount of water that would be offered for sale and
demanded by potential purchasers at that price. 49
Establishment of a "fair and workable price" was
45. Id. at 28-29.
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one of the most difficult and time-consuming issues
faced by the Water Purchase Committee.50 Although
the Department of Water Resources has stated that
"the value to the potential user had to be considered"
in establishing the purchase price for water transferred
to the Bank.5! the opportunity cost to potential sellers
of not transferring water was the dominant factor in
the Water Purchase Committee's pricing calculus. The
committee began with the assumption that most of
the water transferred to the water bank would come
from the fallowfng of rice. corn. and wheat in the lower
Sacramento Valley and the Delta. 'The intent was to
offer a price that would yield a net income to the
farmer similar to what the farmer would have earned
from farming plus an additional amount to encourage
the farmer to enter into a contract with a new and
untried water bank."52 At the same time. both DWR and
the Governor expressed a strong desire to prevent sellers from earning excessive profits by charging higher
prices based on individual buyers' willingness to pay.53
Thus. "lalfter taking a detailed look at farm budgets,
talking to potential sellers and buyers, and getting
advice from agricultural economists and others knowledgeable about crop water use." DWR set the purchase
price for water transferred to the Water Bank at S125
per acre-foot.Y
The Water Bank entered into 351 contracts for the
purchase of 821.045 acre-feet of water.s Participating
sellers provided water from three different sources: (1)
surface water conserved as a result of fallowing land
that the seller otherwise would have irrigated: (2) surface water made available by the seller's decision to
use groundwater in its place, and (3) surface water previously stored by the seller that was in excess of the
seller's projected needs for the water year.56
Three hundred twenty-eight of the contracts.
specified In the contract

46. Id. at 28.

Id at 10-11

47. Id. at 29.

Initially. DWR was criticized for setting a price that many perceived
to be substantially etow the true market price for water See, eg..
David
Newdorf. 'rf. Smrarf! t:r Wa.,r. SF RECCam, Mar 4, 1991. at I
Representatives of the Sacramento Valley rice growers stated, for example. that the S 125 per acre-foot offered by the Water Bankwas only about
one-third of the price that they would be willing to accept to faflow their
land. Set Sabin Russell. Prctets cn "V1a,.r
Bank' Prices. S F. ¢.,zc E Mar.
9.1991. at I.Ultimately, few rice growers pa dtidpated In the Water Bank.
1992 DWR REPcSr. supam note 7, at 4 As events transpired, however the
price of water fell in the months after the creation of the Water Bank.
Although the Bank paid S125 per acre-foot to all participating sellers.

48. Id.
49. 1992 DWR REPoRT.
supra note 7. at I.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. SeeEric Brazil. Stae "Water Bank" Tap Lrks Dry. S.F. Ex.'&um.
Feb. 28. 1991. at 7.
54. 1992 DWR REPORT.
supra note 7. at 5. The standard form transfer contracts also included a "price escalator clause." which was
designed to induce potential sellers to participate In the water bank
early in the process, rather than waiting for a higher price In the event
that water conditions worsened and market factors drove up the contract
price.) RicHARD
Hoxwr. E' AL. A REaTosnscnvE o4 CAUmRNLA.s 1991
EeGomcy DROUGHT
WATER BANK10 (1992) (hereinafter'Howrr REPOW)I
Under the clause, if the average price paid similarly-situated
sellers In contracts executed by a specified future date
exceeded by 10 percent the price specified In the contract
then the seller would receive the higher price. If the average
price paid similarly- situated sellers was less than the contract price, the seller would still receive the (higher) price

Illate In the Iear. the SWP negotiated contracts for the purchase of 10.000 acre-feet at S50 per acre-foot and 10,000 at
S30 per acre-foot The price reduction reflected the more
faorab!e water supply and demand conditions. Among the
factors contributing to the Impro;ed conditions were the
ample March rains, a mild summer, and the remarkable success of the Water Bank and urban water conservation measures
IEd
at5
55 Ho'ar Rscs-r. supra
note 54. at 10
56 Id at 10-11
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accounting for 50 percent of the purchased water, were
"fallowing contracts" by which the sellers were paid not
to irrigate crops. 7 Fifty-nine percent of the 166,093
acres fallowed were located along the lower
Sacramento River and in the Delta.58 Of this land,
40,206 acres were in Yolo County and 18,551 acres
were in Solano County.5 9 This represented 12 percent
of the acreage irrigated during the preceding five years
in Yolo County and approximately 10 percent of the
estimated crop value. For Solano County. the fallowed
land represented less than 10 percent of the irrigated
60
acreage, but 18 percent of the estimated crop value.
DWR established a "crop fallowing payment
schedule," which listed the estimated amount of
61
applied water consumed by each of the fallowed crops.
These estimates ranged from a high of 3.5 acre-feet per
acre for rice, alfalfa, and pasture in the Sacramento
Valley and Delta Upland, to a low of 1.0 acre-foot per
acre for grain in the Sacramento Valley and the Delta. 62
Along with promising not to irrigate crops during the
1991 growing season, farmers who participated in the
fallowing program also agreed to eliminate weeds and
other vegetation that would consume significant quantities of water.63 The contracts also provided that sellers who irrigated land that they had agreed to fallow,
would be liable for liquidated damages of double the
price paid for the fallowing.6
Nineteen contracts, amounting to 33 percent of
the water sold to the Bank, were for what DWR has
characterized as "groundwater."65 Under these contracts, the sellers "agreed to pump groundwater to irrigate crops and allow [the] surface water they normally
used to be transferred to the Water Bank."66 The usual
arrangement was for the seller to use its own wells to
obtain the groundwater and for the seller's water district to "release an equal amount of its surface supply
to the Bank."67 In a few cases, accounting for less than
10,000 acre-feet, the seller directly transferred ground57. Id. The term -fallowing contract" Is a bit of a misnomer,
because the contracts prohibited only the irrigationof land subject to the
contract. Thus, consistently with the contract, the seller could plant any
crop that would not require Irrigation. 'Grain, pasture, and alfalfa were
allowed If Irrigation was withheld for the entire season. Land intended
for corn, tomatoes, and other annual crops was left fallow. Asparagus
was allowed Ifthe crop was plowed under." 1992 DWR REPORT.
supra note
7, at 7.
58. Howitt Report, supra note 54, at 10.; 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra
note 7, at 4.
59 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra note 7, at 4.
60. HowrTr REPORT.
supra note 54. at 18.
61L Id. at II.
62. Id. The "estimated crop consumptive use- was equal to the
crop's evapotranspiratlon under the assumption that rainfall during the
1991 growing season would be equal to that of the 1977 growing season
Because the actual rainfall for 1991 exceeded these projections, however,
DWR reduced Its estimates of crop water needs for certain
crops such as wheat and grain. For example, before March I.
DWR estimated that grain would consume 2.0 af/acre of
applied water. With the unusually heavy March rains, DWR
reduced the estimates to 1.5 at/acre after March 1.and final-

water to the Water Bank.68 DWR reviewed construction
records for each of the participating seller's wells In
order to ensure that the groundwater pumped in lieu
of the transferred surface water was not taken from the
river and therefore represented a "new" source of sup69
ply to the surface water system.
Nevertheless, "Icloncerns were expressed that
groundwater might be pumped for use outside the
basin."70 DWR responded to these concerns by including in the contracts for purchase of "groundwater" from
Butte, Yolo, ana Yuba Counties the requirement that
the sellers establish groundwater monitoring programs to measure both the quantity of groundwater
pumped and the effects of the increased withdrawals
on the groundwater table.7' In addition, the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors limited the amount of
groundwater that could be pumped as a substitute for
transferred surface water to the seller's maximum use
during the ten preceding years. The County also
received from each seller two percent of the seller's
gross revenues from the transfers to the Water Bank.
DWR agreed to reimburse the sellers for 50 percent of
their monitoring expenses up to a fixed limit and for
all of the seller's costs of making the two percent gross
72
receipts payment to the County

The balance of the water transferred to the Water
Bank-approximately 17 percent of the total supplies-was obtained through four contracts for the
purchase of previously stored water that was surplus
to the projected needs of the transferors.7 3 Of the
139,580 acre-feet of stored water, 129,200 acre-feet was
acquired from the Yuba County Water Agency, which
was a source of supplemental water throughout the
1987-1992 drought.7 4 The contract with Yuba County
provided for the release of 99,200 acre-feet to the
Water Bank in 1991, with the remaining 30,000 to be
stored in New Bullards Bar Reservoir on behalf of DWR
for release in 1992. 75 In addition, Yuba County agreed
ly to 1.0 at/acre by March 13.
Id.at 12.
The fallowing contracts were based on the estimated consumptive
use at the time each agreement was executed Id, For a complete list of
the estimated consumptive use for each crop Involved In the 1991 Water
Bank. seeid. at 13.
63. Id. at II.
64. Id.
65. 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra note 7. at 8
66. Id.
67. Howrrr REPORT,
supra note 54, at 1268. 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra note 7. at 8
69. Id.; Hovrr REPORT,
supra note 54, at 12.
70. 1992 DWR REPORT.
supra note 7, at 8
71. Howrrr REPORT,
supra note 54. at 12
72. See infra part Il.E(1).
73. 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra note 7. at 8
74. Howrrr REPORT,
supra note 54, at 10. see Gray, supra note 2. at 12
75. Howrrr REPORT,
supra note 54, at 13
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to transfer another 28,000 acre-feet to DWR for distribution to the Department of Fish and Game.7 6 The price
for the water transferred to the Water Bank was S125
per acre-foot. The price for the water transferred to the
Department of Fish and Game was $50 per acre-foot."7
DWR offered to sell water acquired by the Water
Bank to 'any corporation, mutual water company, or
public agency.. .that had responsibility to supply water
for agricultural, municipal and industrial, fish and
wildlife, or other uses in California in 199. "78 In accordance with the Drought Action Team's recommendation that water held by the Water Bank should be allocated for the purposes of 'firming up urban supplies to
minimum levels, meeting critical agricultural uses.
preservation of fish and wildlife, and carryover storage
for 1992, "79 however, the Department established a set
of priorities to guide its selection of purchasers. These
priorities, listed in order, were:
I. Emergency needs, such as related to health
and safety.
2. Areas with critical needs, which DWR
defined as -urban users with less than a 75
percent water supply; agricultural users who
needed water to assure survival of permanent
or high-value crops. and fish and wildlife
resources."
3. 'Other critical needs, such as water to meet
critical needs for the first few months of 1992.
until next year's water supplies are known
and available."
4. Additional supplies for Water Bank participants that purchased water for critical needs
76. Id.
78. Id.at 5.
79. DAT REPoRT. supra note 8, at vil.
80. 1992 DWR REPO r. supra note 7. at 9.
81. HowITr REPoRT. supra note 54, at 7. Table 1.
82. Listed from north to south, the 12 purchasing agencies were

Alameda County Food Control and
Water Consen'ation District
Santa Clara Valley Water District
Oak Flat Water District
Westlands Water District
Dudley Ridge Water District
Kern Country Water DIstrict
Crestllne-Lake Arrowhead Water Agency
Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California

1992 DWR REPoRT. supra note 7. at 6.

h.

.nd
the Crmmnit

and which -need additional supplies to
reduce substantial economic impacts resulting from reduced water supplies.'
5. Carryover storage for the State Water
Project.13
Eighteen water agencies initially joined the Water
Bank as potential purchasers by submitting 'estimates
of critical needs' on April 1. 1991.81 Twelve of these
agencies ultimately entered Into contracts to purchase
389.970 acre-feet of water from the Bank. 82 The discrepancy between the 821.045 acre-feet acquired by
the Water Bank and the 389.970 allocated to the twelve
purchasers is the result of two factors. First. there are
significant carriage losses incurred when water is
transported through the Delta for diversion at Clifton
Court Forebay. These carriage losses, which usually
amount to approximately 20 percent of the water
moved through the Delta, were only about 14 percent
of the water transferred through the Delta pursuant to
the 1991 Water Bank. 83 Second, the heavy and unexpected March rains decreased demand, particularly for
"non-critical' uses. As a result. DWR retained approximately 250.000 acre-feet of the acquired water as carryover storage for 1992.e4 Indeed, given the various
uncertainties-the amount of water that would be
offered for sale to the Water Bank. the amount of water
that would be requested for allocation from the Bank,
whether a market-clearing price would be established,
and the unpredictability of the weather-it was essential that DWR stand ready to purchase the surplus
water remaining In the Water Bank at the dose of the
1991 water year.
The base purchase price for water was $175 per
acre-foot. 8' This reflected the SI 25 per acre-foot cost of
83 According to DWR. of the 821,045 acre-feet
acquired by the
Water Bank.

77. Id.

American Canyon County Water Distict
Contra Costa Water Distric
San Frandsco Water Department
Alameda Country Water District

I

370
6.717
50.000

12.90D
50D
19.750
975
13.820
13.05
53.797
236
215.000

lalpprouimately 165.000 acre-feet was subtracted due to
Delta carriage water requirements and technical corrections For the 1991 Drought Water Bank. [carriage lossesl
were calculated to be 14 percent. a melded c;erall rate
which reflected the 1arious specific sources of water for the
Bank. The technical correctons were In two components
The first component was an after-th-fact fine tuning of the
crop consumptve use numbers between the Department
and the Bureau of Reclamatioa The second component was
a correction for actual rainfall. wh!ch resulted In a decrease
of about 30.000 acre-feet from the total purchased amount
This left a net of about 655.000 acre-feet of water that could
be delivered. whtch was apportioned 390.00 acre-feet to
meet critical water needs of the btriers. and 265000 acrefeet for State water project caroywer storage
Letter from Robert G Potter. Chief Deputy Director. California
Department of Water Resources 2 (Sept 8. 1993l (on file with author.
84 Hoam R ,"=r.
supra note 54. at 63 For a more detailed explanation of hows DWR allocated water to the participating agencies. erz id
at 5-10
85 1992 DWR REres.r supra note 7. at 9
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acquiring the water plus $45 per acre-foot for carriage
losses and technical corrections and administrative
expenses of $5 per acre-foot.8 6 Most of the water was
delivered through SWP facilities. Buyers who used
these facilities also paid for the operation and maintenance costs incurred by DWR in delivering the water.
Purchasers that were not SWP contractors also paid a
"use of facilities fee, which was a proportional share of
the capital and annual costs associated with SWP facil87
ities used to make the transfer."
Although the reduced diversions and retention of
water sold to the Water Bank provided some benefits
to Sacramento River fisheries and other instream
8
the increased pumping of water from the Delta
uses,A
for delivery to the Water Bank's customers had threatened Delta water quality and posed serious problems
for several species of fish. Initially, DWR and the
Bureau of Reclamation proposed to lessen the ambient water quality standards for chlorides at three locations in the Delta-Rock Slough, the CVP Tracy
Pumping Plant, and Clifton Court Forebay. 89 The parties withdrew their petition, however, when the unexpected March rains provided the flows needed to
achieve the existing Delta water quality standards. 90
Nevertheless, because five years of drought had
"already placed the Delta in a vulnerable condition,"
the State Water Resources Control Board asked DWR
to prepare an evaluation of the effects of Water Bank
transfers on Delta fisheries.9' From this study, DWR
determined that increased pumping from the Delta
associated with the Water Bank would increase the
entrainment losses of American shad, Delta smelt, and
striped bass, particularly during the months of June,
July, and August. 92 Accordingly, DWR decided to withdraw water from storage in San Luis Reservoir to fulfill
its contract obligations to the Water Bank purchasers
south of that facility, and to defer the increased diversion of water from the Delta until September and
October, 93 DWR then replaced the water taken from
San Luis Reservoir in the summer with the water
94
diverted from the Delta during the fall months.
D. Evaluations of the Water Bank
By virtually all accounts, the 1991 Water Bank was
a success. According to DWR, the Bank "is an example
86. Letter from Robert G. Potter. Chief Deputy Director, California
Department of Water Resources 2 (Sept. 8. 1993) (on file with author).
lTlhe Delta carriage water requirement is a quantity of additional water
needed as Delta outflow to maintain compliance with Delta water qualIty standards for a given increase in export pumping under conditions of
reverse flow In the western Delta." Id.
87. Id.
88, See Infra text accompanying notes 209-10.
CONTROLBOARD.NoricE oF
89. CAUFORNIA
STATEWATER RESOURCES
CONSIDERATION
OF DROUGHTEMERGENCY
PUBLICHEARING
ANDBOARDMEETING:
ACTIONSIN RESPONSE
RELATED
FIERGENCY WATERRIGHTORDERAND RELATED
TO A REQUESTFORA HEARINGFROMiTHE DEPARTMENT
OF WATERRESOURCES,
OF WATER
(1991). see CAUFORNIA DEPARTMiENT
ACTIONS To BE CONSIDERED
MODIFCATIONS
OF
EFFECTOF TE.%PORARY
RESOURCES,DELTAPROTECTIONs:

WATER
RIGHT
PEPmrrs 8-9 (1991).

of what can be created with resourcefulness and cooperation. Over 800,000 acre-feet of water was developed
in a short time because all of the participants were
committed to the program's success."9' Moreover, the
"large-scale water transfer program was implemented
in less than 100 days with the help of the entire water
community, and important links with local water Interests and local government were established for future
programs."9
Outside observers have been equally complimentary. An influential analysis of the Water Bank concludes that while "not everyone was supportive of
water banking, the consensus was that the Bank was
successful, particularly given the emergency circumstances under which it was created.... DWR staff, especially those leading the Bank's management, were sin97
gled out by a number of participants for high praise.
The interviews conducted for this study confirm this
9
conclusion. 8

!1.
A Legal Analysis of the 1991 Water Bank
The 1991 Water Bank achieved the primary purpose for
which it was created-to reallocate developed water
supplies on a short-term basis from users who either
could do without or had alternative water sources to
users located in other areas of California for whom
continued shortages threatened severe hardship. As
DWR has observed, because of the existence of the
Water Bank, the implementation of "stringent conservation practices, plentiful March rains, and a mild
summer, conditions that could have been disastrous
in some areas were made bearable."99
Yet, the transfer of water to areas with critical supply deficiencies was only one of several goals set forth
by the Drought Action Team in its report to the
Governor recommending the formation of a Water
Bank. These other goals were:
1. Protection of the water rights of transferors
of water to the Water Bank.
2. Preservation of fish and wildlife.
90. 1992 DWR REPORT. supra note 7. at 10.
91. Id.
92. Memorandum from Randall H. Brown to Larry Gage Fish
Impacts of Water Bank Delta Transfer, California Department of Water
Resources (July 3, 1991}lherelnafter "Fish Impacts Memorandum.*lion
file with author).
93. 1992 DWR REPORT,supra note 7,at 10.
94. Id.at I1.

95. Id.at 19.
96. Id.
97. HowrrT REPORT. supra note 54, at 21.
98. See infra part I.E-F.

99. 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra note 7,at 19.
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3. Mitigation of the effects of transfer on
third-parties.
4. Recognition of county-of-origin and areaof-origin laws.It °
In marked contrast with the successful transfer of
water to areas of critical need, it is far less clear
whether the Water Bank fulfilled these other policies
and promises. Indeed, while the interviews conducted
for this paper confirm the conclusion that the administrators of the Water Bank undertook a Herculean task
with alacrity and sensitivity for the interests of the
counties from which the water was transferred and
other third-parties affected by the transfers, several
critical legal decisions were made that reduced the
probability that the last three of the Drought Action
Team's goals would be achieved.
As the remainder of this paper will show, through
both existing laws governing water transfers and special legislation enacted to encourage transfers to the
Water Bank, DWR was able to provide iron-clad guarantees to transferors that the sale of water to the Bank
would not in any way jeopardize their water rights. Yet.
because the transfers of water to the Bank overwhelmingly involved surface water held pursuant to riparian
right and surface water for which groundwater was
substituted, both the State Water Resources Control
Board and the laws that establish a process for protecting third-party water rights holders, fish and
wildlife, instream flows, and other interests within the
areas-of-origin were effectively removed from the
transfer process. Moreover. because of the decision
legally to characterize the transfers for which groundwater was substituted as transfers of surface water for
one purpose and transfers of groundwater for another,
the laws designed to protect the counties in which
groundwater originates were circumvented.
As explained below, all of these legal decisions
may have been justifiable under the perceived emergency conditions that existed at the time the Water
Bank was established and the transfer contracts written. But they raise troubling questions about the efficacy of laws enacted to balance the interests of water
users who participate in the market and the interests
of those who are not parties to the transfer contracts
100. DAT REsoR. supra note 8. at vill-Ix
101. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System. 25 Cal 3d
339. 357-358 (1979).
102. For the participating ripanans. the most significant legal
question was whether they could transfer their water to the Bank without violating the riparian land and watershed limitation of the riparian
rights system, see. Anaheim Union Water Co v Fuller. 150 Cal 327
(1907). The way in which DWR avoided these problems is discussed
below in Part IIC. The CVP water rights settlement contractors had the
additional problem of persuading the Bureau of Reclamation that at
least the water rights settlement portion of their contracts should be
transferable under the provisions of California law and not be subject to
the Bureau's restrictions on transfers of -prolect" water This problem
will be analyzed in part i1D

. ... t .d. . C .. .ir .

that formed the Water Bank
A.The Legal Backdrop
An essential prerequisite to the 1991 Water Bank
was the enactment over the preceding twelve years of
legislation that encourages voluntary transfers of
water by explicitly authorizing the sale of conserved
and surplus water and by protecting the water rights of
users who choose to transfer water to others. The surface water transferred to the Water Bank was held pursuant to five types of rights. riparian rights; pre-1914
appropriative rights. riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights now embodied in CVP contracts with the
United States Bureau of Reclamation: permitted or
licensed appropriative rights administered by the
State Water Resources Control Board: and entitlements to water based on the user's membership in a
local water agency Each of these categories is subject
to different legal rules regarding nonuse and forfeiture.
For the riparians. including the CVP water rights
settlement contractors, participation in the Water
Bank posed little risk. because riparian rights may not
be lost or diminished by nonuse.' 01 Therefore. the
decision to forego water for one growing season would
not jeopardize the transferors" future water rightsro2
Because appropriative rights can be lost by
nonuse.=03 the Legislature enacted a statute in 1979,
which declares the conservation and transfer of water
to be a beneficial use and that prohibits the forfeiture
of the water not used as a result of these practices.
Section 10 11 of the Water Code permits an appropriator to reduce its water use through the implementation of conservation measures and to retain full rights
to the conserved water. The statute defines conservation broadly as -the use of less water to accomplish
the same purpose or purposes of use allowed under
the existing appropriative right, "lea Moreover, water
saved as a result of -land fallowing or crop rotation'
qualifies under the statute as 'conserved water." 0'
According to subsection (a), the -cessation or reduction in the use of such appropriated water shall be
deemed equivalent to a beneficial use- of the conserved water.106 Subsection (b) then authorizes the
sale. lease, or exchange of the conserved water, subject to the general water transfer laws,)07 The
Legislature sought to guarantee the water rights of
103 California Water Code § 1241 pro-4:1-ds that appropriative
nghts held pursuant to Permit or license are subect to forfeiture if the
water is not beneficially used for a pnod of five years and that -such
unused water may revert to the publcarnd shall. it reverted, be regarded
as unappropriated water' CALWATE?
Cc. § 1241 1%est Supp 1994)
Pre-1914 appropnatve rights also may be forfeited if the water is not
beneficially used far a period of fi'e years Smith v Ha'zklns. 110 Cal
122. 127(18951
104 CA, wAMi COoE § 101 Ia) IVest Supp 1994)
105 ld
106 Id
107 Id § 101 1(b) As disussed beo, ". the other transfer laws
grant the State Water Resources Control Board iunsdiction over all
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appropriators who conserve and transfer water pursuant to this section by declaring that "[nmo forfeiture
of the appropriative right to the water conserved shall
occur upon the lapse of the [applicable] forfeiture period.,,,08
Several other provisions of the Water Code
address the rights of individuals who do not themselves own water rights, but instead receive their water
from a local water agency. Section 382 declares that
"lnlotwithstanding any other provision of law, every
local or regional public agency authorized by law to
serve water to the inhabitants of the agency may sell,
lease, exchange, or otherwise transfer water that is surplus to the needs of the agency's water users for use
outside the agency."1° 9 Section 383 then defines "surplus water" in three different ways. Subsection (a)
authorizes the agency to transfer water "which the
agency finds will be in excess of the needs of water
users within the agency for the duration of the transfer." 110 Subsection (b) permits the transfer of water
conserved by individual users within the agency where
the agency, rather than the user, holds the water
right."' Subsection (c) authorizes the transfer of conserved water by individual users within an agency who
hold their own water rights. Itprovides that "the water
user and the agency Imayl agree, upon mutually satisfactory terms, that the water user will forego use for
the period of time specified in the agreement" with the
transferee and directs that the agency "shall act as
12
agent for the water user to effect the transfer."
Transfers made pursuant to these provisions are subject to the general transfer laws, including the requirement that any change in the point of diversion, place
of use, or purpose of use set forth in the transferor's
permit or license be approved by the State Water
13
Resources Control Board.
Although these sections of the Water Code do not
contain the same type of "anti-forfeiture" guarantees
provided by section 101 1, they are subject to section
1244 of the Code, which establishes a general protection of the water rights of persons or agencies that
transfer water. Section 1244 declares:
The sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of water
or water rights, in itself, shall not constitute
transfers of surface water held pursuant to a permit or license that
require a change In the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use
set forth In the permit or license. Transfers of groundwater and of surface water held pursuant to a riparian or pre-1914 appropriative right are
categorically exempt from this aspect of the Board's jurisdiction. See infra
part lI.B.
CODE
§ 1011(a) (West Supp. 1994).
108, CAL. WATER
109. Id.§382(a).
110, Id. § 383(a).
I ! 1. Id. § 383{b).

I'2. Id.§ 383(c).
113. Id.§§ 384 & 386; see infra part Il.B. In addition, before engaging
In a transfer to users sered by another water agency, the transferor must

evidence of waste or unreasonable use,
unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion and shall not affect
any determination of forfeiture applicable to
water appropriated pursuant to the Water
Commission Act or this code or water appropriated prior to December 19, 1914.114
Taken together, these statutes "afford
potential transferors a reasonable assurance... that by offering water for sale, entering
into negotiations, or conducting studies of
potential conservation yields within their service areas, they will not lose their water
rights. Neither the transfer nor the negotiations leading up to the transfer may be used
as evidence that the transferor's lwater
rights exceed its actual reasonable needs." 15
Thus, of all the problems faced by DWR In the days
leading up to the formation of the Water Bank, the
issue of least consequence should have been the fear
that by participating in the Bank sellers would subject
their water rights to the risk of forfeiture or divestment
based on waste or unreasonable use. Yet, in hearings
conducted in January 1991, the State Water Resources
Control Board "heard testimony that some water users
may be afraid to transfer water for fear of prejudicing
their water rights."' 16
Consequently, to assuage any lingering doubts
about the legal effects of selling water to the Water
Bank, the Legislature convened an "Extraordinary
Session" in March and April 1991 to enact special
transfer legislation to encourage transfers to the
Bank. 117 Two of these statutes are germane to this
analysis. Both laws expired on January 1, 1993.
Assembly Bill No. 9, sponsored by Assemblyman
Cortese, authorized any water supplier to transfer
water to the Water Bank or to users outside the water
supplier's service area if two requirements were satisfied:
]."The governing body of the water supplier
determines that it is in the best Interests of
the water supplier to transfer the water."

obtain the consent of the "recipient" agency. CAL WATERCOE § 385
(West Supp. 1994). Inasmuch as all of the transfers were to the Water
Bank for redistribution to the participating purchasing agencies, this
requirement posed no problems.

114. CAL WATER CODE§ 1244 (West Supp. 1994).
115. Brian E. Gray, A Primeron CaliforniaWater Transfer Law, 31 ARe
L. REv. 745. 774 (1989).
116. DAT REPORT,
supra note 8, at 29.
117. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. IX-5X. Because the Legislature declared
these acts to be "urgency statutelsl necessary for the Immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning ol Article
IV of the ICalifornial Constitution,' they took effect Immediately upon
the Govemor's signature. SeeId.ch. IX, § 9.
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2.'The water supplier has allocated to the
water users within its service area the water
available for 1991 and no user will receive
less than the amount provided by that alloca8
tion without that user's consent."'
The statute covered the types of transfers to the
Water Bank that DWR was in the process of negotiating. It applied only to water made available by conservation or use of an alternative source of supply and to
water -developed pursuant to a contract by a water
user to reduce water use below the user's allocation or
to eliminate the use of water during 1991. including a
contract to grow crops without the use of water from
the water supplier, to fallow land, or to undertake
other action to eliminate water use." 119 The law also
provided that a participating water supplier could
transfer water to the Water Bank 'whether or not the
water proposed to be transferred is surplus to the
needs within the service area of the water supplier. "2 0
Assembly Bill No. 10. authored by Assemblyman
Costa, was designed to protect the water rights of
those who sold water to the Water Bank. It provided
simply that "Inlo temporary transfer of water made
pursuant to any provision of law for drought relief in
calendar years 1991 and 1992 shall affect any wlater
2
rights."1 '

The Department of Water Resources has stated
that the 'Drought Water Bank probably would not have
gotten off the ground as quickly as it did had it not
been for Ithesel two key pieces of legislation."122 This
is probably an accurate assessment of AB 9's authorization of transfers of water that is not necessarily surplus to the needs of other users within the service area
of the transferor. As one attorney noted at the time.
under the circumstances, there was 'no way that the
board lof directors of a water districtl could make a
declaration there are water surpluses. "123 The new legislation thus resolved the vexing legal question
118.

Id.ch. IX. § I.

119, Id.ch IX. § 2.
120. Id.ch. IX. §43
121. Id.ch. 2X. §I (a)
122 1992 DWR REPORT. supra note 7. at 15
123. David Newdorf. The Scramble for Water. S.F REcoREDR. Mar 4.
1991. at I (quoting Edward Tiedemannl On the other hand. § 383(c) of
the Water Code already authorized the transfer of water that Individual
users choose (with the water agency's consent) not to use CAL WATER
ConE § 383(c) (West Supp. 1994). Section 383 defines this water as 'surplus- notwithstanding the claims of other members of the agency Id §
383; see supra text accompanying notes 110-12 A water agency's board of
directors therefore could make a declaration that -surplus water' existed
within the agency. which could be transferred to the Water Bank. The
real problem, however, was that the legal definition of surplus water
under § 383 did not correspond with the common understanding of the
term 'surplus.' For this reason, although Assembly Bill 9 did not slgnlficantly change the legal powers of the water agencies. It did clarify their
water transfer authority as a practical matter.
124 See Brian E. Gray. Bruce C Driver & Richard W Wahl. Tfe
Transferability of Federal Reclamation Water A Case Study of Ca!o4n's San
Joaquin Valley. 21 Euvn_ L 911. 972-76(1991).
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whether non-participating members of a local water
agency could claim water that the agency or another
member proposed to conserve
and transfer to users
24
located outside the agency
At first blush, it isdifficult to agree with the
Department's conclusion that AB 10 was necessary to
the creation of the Water Bank. As noted above, existing law already provided that the decision to conserve
or to transfer water could not be used as evidence of
unreasonable use and that. following a transfer, all
rights revert t6 the transferor. Yet. statutes do not
always alter human behavior In the way in which the
Legislature intended, and there remained in early 1991
a widespread belief that participants in the Water Bank
would incur a substantial risk of forfeiting their rights
to the water offered for sale. In the words of the
Manager of the Water Bank, "Water users were still
apprehensive Our conclusion was tied to perceptions of
prospective sellers, who felt more assured after JAB 9
and AB 10 were enactedl and thus were more villing to
sell.' 12 An attorney who represented a number of
transferors to the 1991 Water Bank. and who helped to
draft many of the transfer statutes discussed in this
section, confirms this analysis. In his discussions 'with
growers in water districts to encourage participation in
the water bank.' he observes. 'there was a tremendous
concern about water rights protection. The more
statutes you could show them the more it seemed to
help. So that was an important aspect of the special
legislation." 26
The temporary statutes were useful, perhaps even
essential, to the creation of the 1991 Water Bank,
because they provided the last measure of transfer
authority and water rights protection that participating
farmers and water agencies needed to convince them
to sell some of their supplies to the Bank. For this reason. the Legislature has made the provisions of
Assembly Bills 9 and 10 permanent features of
California water transfer law.'2

125 Letter from Steve Mlacaulay. Manager of the Drought Water
Bank. Califomia Department of 'later Resources Ifan 6, 1993) (emphasis In original) (on Ile with authorl

126 Ur.ssu'e or
c±rros,
As uaa,.
-t4lssscs-rsm A.,jDVMTL
REScCES crs.'ru.c,±ra.!A ATER
Tex'zssss G~x5R5A:4D Los-nm or
Nos m n.'iCot -s 60 119921 Ihereinafter 'UC Co:;,-TERcF RPOr')
(comments of Paul ?M BartktT.icz)
127 192 Cal Siat ch 481.§ I This statute pr--des
A %ater supplier may contract with a state drought water
bank or with any other state or local water supplier or user
InsIde or outside the service area of the water supplier to
transfer, or store as part of a transfer, water if the water supplier has allocated to the water users within Its service area
the water available for the water year. and no other userwill
receive less than the amount pro.ided by that allocation or
be otherwise unreasonably ad ;ersely affected without that
user's consent
CAL WATERCo:Z § 1745 04 (West Supp 1994) The water that may be
transferred pursuant to 1735 04 Is dvfined as (I) stored water. 12) water
that is made availab!e by'lclonservatlon or alternate water supply measures taken y indrdual water users or by the water supplier', and 13)
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B.The Jurisdiction of the State Water Resources
Control Board
Although the State Water Resources Control
Board is the principal regulator of surface water use in
California, none of the transfers of water from Yolo and
Solano Counties to the 1991 Water Bank were reviewed
by the Board. Indeed, of the 351 contracts to sell water
to the 1991 Water Bank, only two-those with the Yuba
County Water Agency and the Oroville-Wyandotte
Irrigation District-were subject to the Board's jurisdiction. 128 This rather startling situation is the product
of two factors. First, much of the water transferred to
the Bank from Yolo and Solano Counties is held pursuant to riparian right or pre-1914 appropriative right.
These rights are categorically exempt from the Board's
permitting and licensing authority and from its jurisdiction over changes in water rights. 29 Second, the
Department of Water Resources, with the acquiescence of the State Water Resources Control Board,
characterized the remaining transfers in a manner that
avoided the jurisdiction that the Board does have over
changes in permitted and licensed appropriative
rights.
Under the existing water transfer laws, the Board
must approve all transfers of surface water appropriated pursuant to a permit or license issued by the Board
where accomplishment of the transfer requires a
change in the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use set forth in the transferor's permit or
license. 30 Two groups of transferors to the 1991 Water
Bank fall into this category.
First, many of the transferors located along the
Sacramento River receive their water under contracts
with the United States Bureau of Reclamation. 131 The
Bureau supplies these contractors with water it appro-

priates at the Shasta and Trinity units of the Central
Valley Project pursuant to permits issued by the State
Water Resources Control Board. 132 Because these contractors held riparian and pre-1914 appropriative
rights that predated the construction of the CVP, their
contracts with the Bureau recognize their pre-project
rights as a "base supply."
The Bureau of Reclamation allowed the CVP water
rights settlement contractors to transfer their base
supplies to the 1991 Water Bank. In acquiring this
water, DWR determined that the water rights settlement contractors' base supplies are legally equivalent
to the riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights that
the contractors held before the CVP was constructed.
Based on this legal characterization of the CVP base
supplies, the Department argued that the transfers
were exempt from the Board's jurisdiction because the
transfers involved riparian and pre-1914 appropriative
rights, rather than water held by the Bureau under permits issued by the Board. 133 These transfers should
have been subject to the Board's jurisdiction, because
the transfers (1) altered the riparian and pre-1914
appropriative rights of the CVP water rights settlement
contractors and (2) changed both the point of diversion and the place of use set forth in the Bureau's permits. The Board did not assert jurisdiction over transfers of CVP water to the Water Bank, however, because
it failed to focus on these legal
issues at the time It
134
approved the CVP transfers.
Second, excluding water used under riparian right
and water supplied by the Bureau of Reclamation pursuant to the water rights settlement contracts, the
remainder of the water transferred to the Water Bank
from Yolo and Solano Counties is appropriated pursuant to permits or licenses granted by the Board,

water that Is -developed" pursuant to a contract "to reduce water use
below the user's allocation or to eliminate the use of water during the
water year." Id.§ 1745.05. The last category includes contracts "to grow
crops without the use of water from the water supplier, to fallow land, or
to undertake other action to reduce or eliminate water use." Id. §
1745.05fa)(2). Thus, the statute expressly recognizes the types of contracts used by DWR in the 1991 Water Bank. However, it limits the
amount of water that may be transferred as a result of land fallowing to
20 percent of the water that would have been "applied or stored' by the
water supplier during any hydrological year in the absence of a contract
under § 1745.04, unless the water supplier approves a larger percentage
following a public hearing. Id.§ 1745.05(b).
The statute authorizes the transfer of water under § 1745.04
"whether or not the water proposed to be transferred is surplus to the
needs within the service area of the water supplier." Id. § 1745.06.
Sections 1745.04 and 1745.06 state that members may not make such
claims to water that has already been allocated to the transferor member (or which the local agency has stored and thereby reserved from allocation), unless the objecting members can prove that they would be
"unreasonably adversely affected" by the proposed transfer. Id. §§
1745.04, 1745 06.
The new law declares that transfers of water made pursuant to §
1745 04 "or any other provision of law" are beneficial uses of water and
shall not "cause a forfeiture, diminution, or impairment of any water
rights - Id.§ 1745 07. These declarations are reiterative of §§ l011 and
1244 of the California Water Code See
supra text accompanying notes 9599 & 104-05. The Legislature also specified that landowners within a
local water agency who also are on the agency's board of directors may
enter into water transfer contracts with the agency. Cal. Water Code §

1745.03 (West Supp. 1994); U C CONEPENCE REPORT,
supra note 126, at 60
(comments of Paul M. Bartkiewicz). Finally, the AB 2897 established criteria for the transfer of surface water for which groundwater Is substituted. These provisions will be discussed infra part II E
128. Telephone Interview with Steve Macaulay. Manager ol the
Drought Water Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8,
1992); Telephone Interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director of the
State Water Resources Control Board (Aug 14, 1992)
129. CAL WATER
CODE§§ 1201. 1706 (West 1971), see Gray, supra
note 115, at 768,
130. CAL. WATER
CODE§ 1701 (West 1971). see aLso Id § 1435 IWest
Supp. 1994) (temporary urgency changes). Id § 1725 (temporary
changes-one year or less), id § 1735 (long-term transfers-more than
one year).
131. Telephone Interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8,
1992); Telephone Interview with Neil W Schild, Assistant Director of the
Mid-Pacific Region of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug 10,
1992).

132. CALIFORNIA
STATE
WATER
RIGHTS
BOARD,
WATEP,
RIGHTDECItON 990
(1961); see United States v State Water Resources Control Board, 182
Cal App. 3d 82, 106 (ist Dist. 1986.
133. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8,
1992); see infra part Ill D,
134. See infra part IL.D
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According to the statutes described above, these
transfers would seem clearly to have fallen within the
Board's jurisdiction. All of these transfers were accomplished. however, by the substitution of groundwater
as a replacement for the surface water sold by the
transferor.135 On the basis of this substitution of supply sources. DWR characterized these transfers as
sales of groundwater, rather than surface water.136 As
such, the transfers were outside the Board's jurisdic37
tion.
Taken together, these legal characterizations of
the water sold to the Water Bank reduced the role of
the State Water Resources Control Board almost to
nothing. Indeed, because all of the transfers to the
Bank from Yolo and Solano Counties involved water
held under riparian right. pre-1914 appropriative
rights, CVP "base supply.' or permitted or licensed
appropriative rights for which groundwater was substituted 13 8 these legal decisions removed the Board
completely from the process of evaluating the effects
of the Water Bank transfers on the two counties. The
consequence of this effort to remove as many of the
surface water transfers as possible from the Board's
jurisdiction was to exempt most of the operations of
the Water Bank from a variety of laws enacted to protect third-parties from harm.
The Water Code authorizes the Board to approve
"temporary changes" in permits and licenses, which it
defines as a change in the point of diversion, place of
use, or purpose of use 'due to a transfer or exchange
of water or water rights if the transfer would only
involve the amount of water that would have been
consumptively used or stored by the permittee or
licensee in the absence of the proposed temporary
change."139 Before the Board may grant the petition, it
must make both of the following factual and policy
135. Telephone Interview with Steve Macaulay. Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8.
1992h. Telephone Interview with Walter Pettit. Executive Director of the
State Water Resources Control Board (Aug. 14. 19921.
136. Id.
137. See infra part lIE_
138. Telephone Interview with Bob Aldridge. Drought Water Bank.
California Department of \vater Resources (Aug. 8. 19921
139. CA. WATER CooE § 1725 IWest Supp. 1994) The law defines
'consumptively used" as 'the amount of water which has been consumed
through use by evapotranspiration. has percolated underground, or has
been otherwise removed from use in the downstream water supply as a
result of direct diversion." Id. A 'temporary change is a change In the
"point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use" associated with a
transfer or exchange of water -for a period of one year or less.- 1 § 1728,
140. Id. § 1727(a). The Board is authorized to make these findings
without conducting a public hearing. Following a determination that the
proposed temporary change would not violate either of the criteria set
forth in the text, the Board must notify the petitioner and the third-party
legal users of water identified in its consideration of the petition that It
has approved the petition. The temporary change then becomes effective
five days after the Board's order of approval is issued. Id § 17271b), It Its
own evaluation of the available information about the potential effects of
the proposed temporary change does not enable the Board to make both
findings within 60 days following receipt of the notice, however, It must
conduct a noticed public hearing on the proposal. Id § 1727(c) The

determinations.
(I) The proposed temporary change would
not injure any legal user of water, during any
potential hydrological condition, through
resulting significant changes in water quantity. water quality, timing of diversion or use.
consumptive use of the water, reduction in
return flows, or reduction in the availability of
water within the watershed of the transferor.
(2) The proposed temporary change would
not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other
4
instream beneficial uses. 0
The statutes that govern transfers of conserved and
surplus water contain similar directives and also
require the Board to determine that the transfer would
not 'unreasonably affect the overall economy of the
4
area from which the water is being transferred."1 '
These laws represent the only specific statutory protections for third-parties that are potentially affected
by water transfers.14 2 Thus, if the laws are not invoked.
there is no formal process for evaluating the effects of
a proposed transfer on other water rights holders, fish
and wildlife. instream uses. and other interests of the
area from which the water will be transferred. 143
C.Transfers of Water Held Pursuant to
Riparian Right
As noted above, because riparian rights are not
subject to the Board's permit and license jurisdiction.
changes in the exercise of such rights also are exempt
from the Board's authority.'" Thus, the transfers to the
Water Bank of water held under riparian right do not
raise questions concerning the Board's regulatory
Board's decision is subject to judiclal redew by writ of mandate.

§
§i

1730 Temporary changes are exempt from the requirements of the
California
Environmental Ouality Act [CAL. Pua R s.Cccv §21 00O e sq.).
Id § 1729
141 Ld§ 3E6 The Board has not yet evaluated a proposed transfer
under this pro'islon. becuse no one has applied to transfer water under
the conserved and surplus water transfer statutes. i. §§ 380-87
Telephone InterIie with Andrew H Sauwyer. Assistant Chief Counsel to
the State Water Resources Control Board ,Mar I. 1993)
142 Sez Gray. supr2 note 115. at 771-79
143 The ways in which DW.R did consider and attempt to protect
third-pany Interests. In the absence of formal review of these Issues ty
the Board. is the subject of part ILF
144 There are two exceptions. First. riparian rights that are quantified In a statutory adjudication. wr. tq.. In re Waters of LcngValfley Creek
Stream System. 25 Cal 3d 339 (1979), are transferable under the
Temporary Change and Long-Term Transfer sections of the California
Water code described above CA. WATER
CcoE § 1740 (West Supp, 19941.
Second. California Water Code § 1707 authorizes all water right holders.
Induding dparians. to dedicate all or a portion of their rights to Instream
uses "for purposes of preserwing or enhancing wetlands habitat fish and
wildlife resources, or recreation In. or on. the water." El. § 1707.
Dedications made pursuant to this saction require the approval of the
State Water Resources Control Board The Board may grant the petition
only if the change la) will not Increase the amount of water the petitioner is entitled to use, and (b) will not 'unreasonably affect any legal user
of water" 1
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jurisdiction. Rather, these transfers present the more
fundamental question of whether DWR violated the
general limitation of the riparian system that prohibits
the use of water held under riparian right on non-riparian land and on land that is not within the watershedof-origin.' 45 For all of the water held pursuant to riparian right that was sold to the Water Bank was transferred out of the Sacramento River and Delta watersheds to the South Bay, to the San Joaquin Valley, and
46
to southern Califomia.i
The administrators of the Water Bank dealt with
this legal difficulty in a creative and convincing way.
According to DWR, the riparians who sold to the Bank
did not transfer water, because to do so would violate
the proscriptions on non-riparian and out-of-watershed use. Rather, the riparians simply agreed not to
divert the water that they normally would have used,
which left that water in the Sacramento River and
Delta channels unclaimed by any water rights holder.
DWR then took advantage of the unused water for the
purpose of meeting its obligations to maintain Delta
water quality.147 This made available SWP water stored
in Oroville Reservoir for use in the Water Bank. In other
words, the Water Bank did not purchase water from the
riparians. Rather, DWR acquired the benefits of water left
in stream by the participating riparians' decision to
48
forego the exercise of their riparian rights.
The way in which the Department of Water
Resources arranged for the transfer of riparian rights
was "Iplerhaps the most innovative" aspect of the
operation of the Bank.' 49 As manager of the State
Water Project, DWR is responsible for releasing water
from Oroville Reservoir or reducing its diversions at
Clifton Court Forebay as necessary to comply with the
salinity standards established by the Board in its 1978
Salinity Control Plan and accompanying water rights
decision. 50 To comply with the Delta water quality
standards, DWR is not required to release a specific
quantity of water. Rather, the Department must augment the flow of water from the Sacramento River system into the Delta when the combined flow from all
145. SceAnaheim Union Water Co.v. Fuller. 150 Cal. 327 (1907).
supra note
supra note 7,at 6; Howrrr REPORT.
146. 1992 DWR REPORT,

51,
Table 3.
WATER
147, Se CALIFORNIA
STATE
WATER
RESOURCES
CONTROL BOARD.
RIGHTSDEcIsION 1485; SACRAMENTO-SAN IOAOUINDELTAAND SUISUNMARSH

(1978).
148. Telephone Interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8,
1992); Telephone interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director of the
State Water Resources Control Board (Aug. 14, 1992). For a description
of the characterization of the transfer of water held pursuant to riparian
supra note 54, at 15-17.
right, see Hownr REPORT,
supra note 54, at 15.
149. Howrrr REPORT,
CONTROLBOARD. WATER
150, CALIFORNIASTATE WATER RESOURCES
JOAOUINDELTAAND SUISUNMARSH(1978);
OUALrWYPLAN SACRAMENTO-SAN
CONTROL BOARD.\VATERRIGHTSDECISION
CALIFORNIA
STATEWATERRESOURCES
1485 SACPAMENTO-SAN
JOAOUINDELTAANDSUISUNMARSH(1978); seeUnited
States v State Water Resources Control Bd.. 182 Cal. App, 3d 82, 1I1 fist

sources is inadequate to meet the standards. Thus, If
other water users along the Sacramento River or in the
Delta may reduce their diversions, and thereby allow
more water from the Sacramento River system to flow
into the Delta, DWR's obligation to release water from
Oroville Reservoir to comply with the Delta water quality standards is concomitantly reduced. This in turn
permits DWR to retain more water in storage or to
move additional water through the Delta for diversion
at Clifton Court Forebay.
In buying fiom riparians on the Sacramento River
and in the Delta the promise not to divert surface
water, DWR was able to accomplish the twin objectives
of complying with the Delta water quality standards
while having more water available for distribution
within the SWP system or to the other purchasers from
the Water Bank. By acquiring only a promise by the
riparians to forego their own uses, rather than purchasing the water itself, DWR gained the use of more
of its own water while avoiding the problem of transferring riparian water to non-riparian land for out-ofwatershed uses. Normally, the fatal flaw In such a
strategy is that, because the water foregone by the
riparians legally "returns to the river," it is available for
downstream.
diversion
by other riparians
Consequently, the purchaser runs the risk that it will
not be able to claim the water-or, in this case, the
benefits of the water-because it will be diverted and
used by more senior water rights holders. The strategy
e.mployed by the administrators of the Water Bank
worked, however, because they were able to acquire
promises from enough of the riparian rights holders
along the lower Sacramento River and in the Delta that
the risk of substantial claims on the water foregone by
the participating riparians and "sold" to the Water
Bank was minimal." 1 Indeed, Water Bank officials
acknowledged that the strategy likely would have
failed had it been employed upriver in the Sacramento
basin without the participation of downstream rlparians, because the lower riparians could have claimed
the water ostensibly "acquired" by the Water Bank,) 2
Dist. 1986). The Bureau of Reclamation, as operator of the Central Valley
Project, Isjointly responsible for compliance with the Delta standards
In 1986, California and the United States agreed conjunctively to operate the SWP and the CVP to comply with the Delta standards Agreement
Between the United States of America and the State of California for the
Coordinated Operation of the Central Valley Proect and the State Water
Project, Pub. L. No. 99-546, 100 Stat. 3050 (1986) The Board revised the
STATE
ambient water quality standards for the Delta In 1992. CALiFORNIA
CONTROL
BOARD,
WATERQUALIY CONTROL PLANFOP
WATERRESOURCES
ESTUARY
11991 )
SALINrrv': SAN FRANCISCO
BAY/SAcRAMENTO-SAN
IOAQUIN
DELTA
It also proposed to extend the obligation to implement those standards
to other major users of water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
STATE
WATERRESOURCES
CONTROL BOARD,
and Delta system. CALIFORNIA
DECISION
1630: SAN FRANCISCO
BAY/SAcRAMENTO-SAN
JOAQUIN
WATERRIGHTS
DELTA
ESTUARY
(1993] (final draft).
151. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8,
1992); Telephone Interview with Bob Aldridge, Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8, 1992
152. Id,
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Four conclusions may be drawn from the Water
Bank's successful acquisition of the benefits of water
held under riparian right. First. this creative, but rather
awkward strategy was necessary to permit the Water
Bank to purchase water from Sacramento River and
Delta riparians. For if DWR had engaged in the more
straightforward approach of simply purchasing water
from riparian landowners, the contracts would have
been illegal under the well-settled principles of riparian rights law.
Second, DWR's strategy of acquiring water, or the
benefits of water, for the purpose of conjunctively
managing the purchased water with its own supplies is
a salutary feature of the Department's administration
of both the SWP and the Water Bank. because the purchases increased the operational flexibility of the project. Indeed, in this respect, the acquisition and use of
the benefits of foregone riparian rights closely resembles DWR's pre-1991 water transfer contracts with the
Yuba County Water Agency in which the Department
acquired water from New Bullard's Bar Reservoir. DWR
used this water to comply with the Delta water quality
standards, while simultaneously retaining more SWP
water in Oroville Reservoir for release later in the year
for delivery to SWP contractors.53
Third. the purchase of a promise from lower
Sacramento River and Delta riparians to forego the
exercise of their own riparian rights was essential to
the success of the 1991 Water Bank. As noted previously, approximately 50 percent of the water sold to
the Bank was made available by the fallowing of riparian land."54 Moreover. acquisition of these riparian
rights assured the administrators of the Water Bank
that the water they acquired upriver-in this case, predominantly from surplus storage and from groundwater exchanges-would actually make it through the
Delta for diversion at Clifton Court Forebay for delivery
to the Water Bank customers. By purchasing the lion's
share of the riparian rights along the lower
Sacramento River and in the north Delta, DWR was
able both to reduce the risk that the water purchased
from upstream users would be claimed by downstream
riparians and to enhance its ability to calculate the
carriage losses incurred in transporting the purchased
water through the Delta.
Fourth, the fact that the administrators of the
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Water Bank were able to establish a workable method
of estimating the amount of water previously used by
the participating riparians. which then became the
basis for quantifying the -rights- that the riparians
could sell to the Water Bank.," is good evidence that
riparian rights can be included in the water transfer
system. Although there were some objections to
DWR's decision to purchase water from riparian rights
holders, which was based on the concern that it would
be impossible accurately to quantify each riparian's
prior water use :156 the experience with the 1991 Water
Bank supports the legislative proposals to permit the
transfer of water by riparians." 7
D. Transfers of Water Supplied by
the Central Valley Project
As noted previously, the water supply agreements
between the Bureau of Reclamation and the CVP contractors that transferred water to the Water Bank create
two types of water service. The 'base supply- represents the pre-project rights of the contractor. This
water Is now supplied pursuant to CVP contract in
recognition of the substantial control that the CVP
exercises over the flow of water in the Sacramento
River. In addition to the base supply, many CVP contractors along the Sacramento River also receive "prolect water.' This represents the contractor's entitlement to water supplied by the CVP in excess of the
contractor's pre-project water rights.158
On February 14. 1991, the Bureau notified its
Sacramento River contractors that, because of the continuing drought and the low storage levels in Shasta
and Trinity Reservoirs, they would be subject to the
reduction In water deliveries applicable throughout
the CVP system. The Bureau informed the water rights
settlement contractors that they would receive 75 percent of their normal contract entitlement-i.e.. 75 percent of the sum of the -base- and -project- supplies." 9
Subsequently, a number of these contractors decided
to sell water to the Water Bank and sought permission
from the Bureau to transfer their supplies. Pursuant to
its 1991 water transfer guidelines, the Bureau authorized the water rights settlement contractors to sell a
portion of their base supply to the Water Bank. but
refused to permit the transfer of any of the project
water component of the contractor's supply to be

153. See Gray. supra note 2. at 16-21

the feasibility of allo-A.ng the transfer of riparian water rights. including

154. Howrr REPoar. supra note 54. at 10. Figure 2.

an assessment of how the Board -would quanlfy the amounts of water
avallab!e for transfer'I

155. The Water Bank administrators' method of estimating the
amount of water previously used by riparians later became the basis for
qualifying the rights' that the riparians could sell to the water bank. Id.
156. The Bureau of Reclamation strongly voiced this objection.
although it ultimately allowed its water rights settlement contractors to
transfer their base supply, which includes their pre-CvP riparian rights.
to the Water Bank. Telephone interview with Nell W. Schild. Assistant
Director of the Mid-Pacific Region of the United States Bureau of
Reclamation (Aug. 10. 1992).
157. See. e.g. AB 2090. 1991-92 Reg. Sess §15 (sponsored by
Assemblyman Richard Katz. which proposed to direct the Board to study

158 Set. eq. Sacramento River Water Righot Contract No 14-06200-7422A Between the United States Bureau of Reclamation and
Woodland Farms. td (now he!d ty the Cona'avy Conservancy Group as
successor-in-Intefest to Woodland Farms. Ltd)
159 Set. eq. Letter from Neil W Schild. Assistant Director of the
Mild-Pacific Region. United States Bureau of Reclamation. to the
Conaway Caonseancy Group IFeb 14. 1911fon file with author) The
reductions were announced in United States Bureau of Reclamation.
Mid-Pacific Region. Central Valle Prolect Water SuppI7 for 1991. at I
(1991)
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transferred for use outside the CVP system. 6° Because
many of the Water Bank customers were non-CVP contractors, this policy effectively prevented the sale of
project water to the Bank.
The Bureau used its own formula to calculate the
amount of each contractor's base supply that could be
transferred to the Water Bank. Each water rights settlement contractor could transfer the lower of 75 percent of its base supply or the average of the high three
years of historical use from 1980 through 1989.161 This
is in marked contrast with the manner in which DWR
calculated the quantity available for transfer. As
described above, for water conserved as a result of fallowing, the Department multiplied the amount of land
farmed during 1990 (or set aside under the federal
farm commodity program, but planned for farming in
1991) by its own estimate of the quantity of water consumed by the type of crop irrigated by the seller.162 For
water made available by shifting to groundwater, DWR
simply credited the transferor for the amount of
groundwater pumped as a substitute supply. 63 Where
there were conflicts between the two methods, the CVP
contractor was permitted to transfer the lesser calcu1 64
lated amount.
The Bureau's transfer policy raises two questions.
First, was it proper for the Bureau to prohibit the transfer of "project water" to the Water Bank? Second, was it
lawful for the Bureau to permit the transfer of the

Sacramento River water rights settlement contractors'
base supplies without seeking the approval of the
State Water Resources Control Board?
The decision not to allow transfers of project
water to the Water Bank was based primarily on the
Bureau's judgment that, with severe shortages
throughout the CVP system, it would be inappropriate
to approve the transfer of project water to non-CVP
contractors. In other words, other CVP contractors
should have first call on the project water available
within the system. 65 While this may have been a legitimate managerial decision regarding the proper allocation of project supplies, it does not fully explain the
categorical judgment that no Oroject water could be
160. UNITEDSTATESBUREAU
OF REcLA.vA'noN, MID-PACInC REGION,1991

CENTRALVALLEY
PROIECT
WATER
TRANSFER
GUIDEuNEs, at I (199 1); Telephone

Interview with Neil W. Schild. Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific
Region of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 8. 1992); see
Letter from Neil W.Schild, Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific Region.
United States Bureau of Reclamation. to Steve Macaulay. Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Jan. 27.
1992)(on file with author).
161. Letter from Nell W. Schild, Assistant Regional Director, MidPacific Region of the United States Bureau of Reclamation. to Steve
Macaulay. Manager of the Drought Water Bank. California Department of
Water Resources (Jan. 27. 1992)(on file with author).
supra note 54, at 11-12; see supra text accompa162. Howrrr REPORT.
nying notes 61-64 (on file with author).
supra note 54. at 12.
163, HowiT REPORT.
164. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 6.
1992)

sold to the Water Bank. Three of the purchasers of
water from the Bank are CVP contractors: the Contra
Costa Water District, the Santa Clara Valley Water
District, and the Westlands Water District, Together,
these purchasers acquired 40,287 acre-feet from the
Bank. 16 If CVP project water had been sold to the
Water Bank, that water could have been segregated for
accounting purposes from the other water and delivered exclusively to these existing CVP contractors. This
arrangement would have helped the Bureau to make
up some of the supply deficiencies that existed
throughout the CVP system. Moreover, because the
water could have been delivered through the Bureau's
existing Delta facilities, the transfer from the
Sacramento River contractors to the Bay Area and San
Joaquin Valley CVP contractors could have been
accomplished without changing the Bureau's water
rights permits and therefore without the approval of
the State Water Resources Control Board. 67 Inasmuch
as the amount of project water offered for sale by the
Sacramento River water rights settlement contractors
was small, however, the Bureau's restrictions on the
transfer of such water were of little practical consequence.'6
The decision to permit the transfer of the
Sacramento River water rights settlement contractors'
base supplies poses a more important, and more difficult, legal issue. Although the water supplied to the
water rights settlement contractors is technically water
appropriated by the Bureau of Reclamation under Its
permits for the CVP, the Bureau and DWR took the
position that the base supply component of this water
service could be transferred without complying with
the transfer laws applicable to changes in water rights
permits, because the base supply represents the preproject rights of the contractors. Inasmuch as the
underlying riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights
are exempt from the Board's permit and license jurisdiction, they should not now be subject to the Board's
authority over transfers of permitted rights simply
because those rights are now embodied in the
Bureau's water rights permits for the CVP.169
165. Telephone interview with Nell W, Schild, Assistant Director of
the Mid-Pacific Region, United States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug 10,
1992)
supra note 7, at 6
166. 1992 D\WR REPORT,

167. SeeGray, Supra note 115. at 779-80
168. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay. Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8,
19921 For the future. Congress has directed that all water supplied by
the CvP be transferable according to California law and additional federal statutory criteria Central Valley Prolect Improvement Act, Pub L
No. 102-575. §§ 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992) The transfer provisions
of the Act are analyzed in Gray, supra note I at 285-95
169. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8,
1992); Interview with Walter Pettit. Executive Director of the State Water
Resources Control Board (Aug, 14. 1992). Telephone interview with Nell
W. Schild. Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific Region of the United
States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug 10, 1992)
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There is some merit to this analysis, for there is no
inherent reason why water rights that predate the CVP
should lose their legal character simply because they
are incorporated contractually into the CVP system.
From the Bureau's perspective, the base supply is not
part of the project supply created by construction of
the CVP. Therefore, that water should not be included
in the 'pool" of water to be distributed as equitably as
possible among the hundreds of CVP contractors during times of system-wide shortage. From the vantage
point of the managers of the Water Bank, characterizing the base supply as "pre-project" water has the twin
advantages of allowing the water to be transferred to
the Water Bank in accordance with the Bureau's policies and without having to go through the change In
water right procedures administered by the State
Water Resources Control Board. What is curious, however, is the Board's view of this important question.
For the consequence of treating the Sacramento River
contractors' base supply as the legal equivalent of
their pre-project rights is to relinquish jurisdiction
over the transfer of such water.
According to its Executive Director and Assistant
Chief Counsel, the Board did not object to the
Bureau's and DWR's legal characterization of the CVP
base supplies or attempt to exercise jurisdiction over
these water transfers for two reasons. First, the staff
members of the Board who reviewed the contracts for
the transfer of the CVP base supplies simply did not
focus on this as a serious legal issue.7 0 Second. the
Board's overriding goal was expeditiously to implement the Governor's emergency drought policies. In
the words of the Executive Director, 'We were trying to
make the Water Bank work. We were not looking for
things to argue about. " 7 Rather, in reviewing the proposed transfers of CVP base supplies, the Board's staff
sought to protect third-party interests and to guard
72
against -glaring" legal errors.
The proper characterization of the CVP base supply is a controversial issue. The Sacramento River
water rights settlement contractors regard the base
supply as water to which they continue to hold the
underlying water rights, even though the water is formally delivered pursuant to CVP contract. This characterization is consistent with the history of water
resources development along the Sacramento River. It
also affords the contractors maximum flexibility over
the use and disposition of the base supply, because

the water would be exempt from the permit and
license and water transfer jurisdiction of the Board.'"
The Bureau of Reclamation has agreed to this characterization of the base supply as a matter of contract
interpretation. 7 4 At least for purposes of the 1991
Water Bank. the Department of Water Resources has
adopted the same characterization of the CVP base
supply. As the Manager of the Water Bank has stated.
the CVP contracts 'do not change pre-existing rights.
Rather. they 'settle' amounts of water under such
rights for the puirpose of operating the CVP." He noted.
however, that "IilIn the case of an adjudication, all bets
are off. and the court Iwouldl settle such rights.""5
in contrast, the Board does not believe that the
CVP base supplies are necessarily tantamount to the
pre-project riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights
of the Sacramento River contractors. As the Assistant
Chief Counsel to the Board has observed, the base
supply quantities set forth in the CVP water rights settlement contracts are not the product of a basin-wide
adjudication, and 'everyone admits that the
Sacramento River water right holders 'firmed up' their
existing rights, particularly in dry years."7 6 Moreover
in implementing the base supply transfers to the 1991
Water Bank. the Bureau retained water in storage for
later release for the benefit of purchasers in the central
and southern parts of the state. Inasmuch as storage is
not part of the riparian right, the transfers from the
CVP water rights settlement contractors that held preproject riparian rights therefore could not have been
accomplished consistently with the sellers' underlying
riparian rights. Similarly. most of the Sacramento River
water rights settlement contractors that held pre-1914
appropriative rights before the construction of the CVP
had only direct diversion rights. Thus, the use of the
Bureau's upstream storage capabilities to facilitate the
transfers also was beyond the scope of those transferors' pre-prolect water rights.I7 In short, as administered during the 1991 Water Bank. the transfers of the
CVP base supplies necessarily implicated the Bureau's
water rights permits for the CVP and therefore should
have been subject to the jurisdiction of the Board.
The Board's staff who subsequently have looked
at this issue candidly admit that the Board's legal
analysis at the time was problematic. Attorneys for the
Board were not closely involved in the evaluation of
the CVP transfers. 178 Its Assistant Chief Counsel has
stated that DWR and the Bureau "represented that

170. Telephone interview with Walter Pettit. Executive Director.
and Andrew H. Sawyer. Assistant Chief Counsel. State Water Resources
Control Board (Sept. 14. 1993)

175 Letter from Steve Macaulay. ?.frnager of the Drought Water
Bank. California DepaRment of Water Resources Ilanuaty6. 19931ion fife
with author)

171. Telephone interview with Walter Pettit. Executive Director of
the State water Resources Control Board (Aug 14. 19921

176 Telephone interview with Andrew I Sawyer. Assistant Chief
Counsel. State water Resources Control Board ISept 13. 19931Ion file
with author)

172. Telephone interview with Walter PettiL Executive Director of
the State Water Resources Control Board (Sept 14. 1993)
173- See Gray supra note 115. at 768 &note 161
174. Telephone interview with Neil W Schild. Assistant Director of
the Mid-Pacific Region of the United States Bureau of Reclamation.
(Aug- 10. 1992)

177 11 In contrast, a 'simp!e by-pass transfer' that did not require
the use of CVP storage facilities rn!.t he exempt from the Boards transfer jurisdiction as %%lthinthe pre-prolect riparian or pre-1914 appropnautve rights of the transferor U
178 Li
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[Boardl review was not necessary, and we didn't look
too closely at the theory. In fact, Iam not sure we even
knew the theory." 7 9 For the future, however, both the
Executive Director and the Assistant Chief Counsel
agree that the Board will assert its jurisdiction over
those transfers of CVP base supplies that exceed the
scope of the transferors' pre-project water rights and
which require a change in the points of diversion,
places of use, or purposes of use set forth in the
Bureau's water rights permits for the CVP. 180
The transfers of the CVP base supplies to the 1991
Water Bank implicated two policies that were often in
tension. On the one hand, removal of those transfers
from the review process administered by the Board
facilitated both the creation of the Water Bank and the
expeditious movement of water from areas of surplus
to areas of deficiency. In view of the water supply conditions facing the state at the time this decision was
made, it is difficult to fault the Board's decision to
place a premium on these water supply goals. On the
other hand, the laws that govern the Board's review
and approval of transfers that are subject to its jurisdiction provide the only means by which third parties
who claim that they will be injured by a water transfer
may formally object to the proposal or seek to condition the transfer on measures designed to mitigate
such harm.' 8' The consequence of the Board's forbearance of authority therefore was to create a vacuum in
which there existed no formal means of determining
whether the CVP base supply transfers could be
accomplished consistently with California's statutory
transfer policies of considering the effects on thirdparty water rights holders, fish and wildlife, other
instream uses, and other interests of the area from
which the water was transferred.
E. Transfers For Which Groundwater Was Substituted
The remaining category of water that was transferred to the 1991 Water Bank was surface water held
pursuant to a variety of types of rights-including permitted and licensed appropriative rights-for which
the transferor substituted groundwater as a replacement water supply. As with the transfers of water held
under riparian right and pursuant to CVP water rights
settlement contracts, these transfers occurred without
the approval of the State Water Resources Control
Board. 82 Yet, many of the "groundwater replacement
179. Id
180 Telephone Interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director,
and Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel, State Water Resources
Control Board (Sept. 14, 1993).
181 Seesupra text accompanying notes 139-43.

182. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8.
1992), Telephone Interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director of the
State Water Resources Control Board (Aug. 14, 1992).
183 Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8,
1992).
184, Id.
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transfers" seemingly were subject to review by the
Board, because they required changes in the point of
diversion, place of use, and in some cases the purpose
of use set forth in the transferors' permits and licenses. The Department of Water Resources nevertheless
was able to avoid the Board's jurisdiction by characterizing these transfers as involving only "groundwater," over which the Board has no jurisdiction, rather
than as transfers of "surface water."'183 Thus, under
DWR's theory, transfers of surface water (which the transferors replaced through increased pumping of groundwater) were treated for legal purposes as though they
were transfers of groundwater (which the transferors did
not need because they continued to use their full surface water allotments).
As with the transfers of CVP base supplies, DWR's
purpose was to purchase water for the Bank as quickly
as possible, and submission of the groundwater
replacement transfers to the Board would have
delayed implementation of those contracts.'8 The
Department's solution to the "problem" of Board
review, however, raised the question, however,
whether the transfers would be subject to a provision
of the "Protected Areas" legislation that was enacted In
1984 to protect local areas in which water originates
from future exports of water that is "reasonably
required to adequately supply the beneficial needs of
the protected area." 185
Section 1220 of the Water Code stipulates that
Inlo groundwater shall be pumped for export
from within the combined Sacramento and
Delta-Central Sierra Basins, as defined In
Department of Water Resources Bulletin 16074, unless the pumping is in compliance with
a groundwater management plan that Is
adopted by ordinance...by the county board
of supervisors, in full consultation with
affected water districts, and that is subsequently approved by a vote in the counties or
portions of counties that overlie the groundwater basin .... 18
All of the "groundwater" transfers to the 1991 Water
Bank involved water from the Sacramento Basin as
defined by section 1220.187 Thus, the statute would
appear clearly to have been applicable to such trans185. CAL W'IATERCODE § 1216 (West Supp 1994)
186. Id. § 1220(a) An exception Is made for water that has percolated Into the groundwater basin "from any reservoir, afterbay, or other
facility of an export project." Id. The act provides that such water may be
returned to the water supply of the export project." Id Subsection (b)
simply authorizes the relevant counties to adopt groundwater management plans to implement the terms of subsection (a) Id § 1220(b)
Subsection (c) states that the county board of supervisors may not exercise the powers granted by § 1220 within the boundaries of another local
water supply agency without that agency's consent Id. § 1220(c)
187. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank. California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8,
1992).
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fers. Nonetheless. the Department of Water Resources
determined that the law did not apply because, for purposes of section 1220. the transfers were of surface water.
not groundwater188
Thus. to avoid the Board's jurisdiction under the
water transfer laws. DWR defined the groundwater
replacement transfers as "groundwater transfers." Yet.
to circumvent the application of section 1220. the
Department characterized the same transfers as "surface water transfers." The obvious legal question presented by this linguistic legerdemain is whether the
Board should have permitted DWR to have it both
ways-alternatively classifying the same water as
groundwater or surface water depending on which
characterization would facilitate the transfer of water
without invoking the burdensome requirements of
change in water right hearings and area-of-origin protections.
The Board did not assert jurisdiction over the
groundwater replacement transfers because it simply
did not see the legal question presented by DWR's
characterization of the transfers. 89 According to the
Board's Assistant Chief Counsel, "DWR believed that
we had no quarrel, but in fact we never bought off on
the theory."190 Indeed. as with the CVP base supply
transfers, this omission may have been the result of
the absence of attorney participation in the Board's
informal review of the groundwater replacement contracts. 19 '
The groundwater replacement transfers are troublesome for two reasons. First, it is disturbing that the
Board-the principal state agency charged with the
management and protection of California's water
resources-would fail to consider the implications of
Water Code section 1220 for transfers that the parties
themselves have characterized as involving "groundwater." Indeed, this omission is particularly surprising
given the Board's view that section 1220 categorically
prohibits the export of groundwater from a protected
area until the county-of-origin enacts a groundwater
management plan under the authority granted by that
statute. 92
Second, it is equally disturbing that the
Department of Water Resources-which also has
broad responsibility to manage and to protect the
state's water resources' 93-would alternatively and
inconsistently define the groundwater replacement
transfers for the explicit purpose of avoiding two
important laws, one or the other of which was express-

ly applicable to such transfers, Section 1220 and the
various provisions of the Water Code that govern the
Board's jurisdiction over water transfers are not simply
sterile formalities that can be cavalierly set aside.
Rather. these laws provide the only direct protection
for an array of third-party interests-including other
water right holders, fish and wildlife, other instream
uses. and groundwater users-that might be injured
by water transfers. In defining the groundwater
replacement transfers so as to circumvent these laws,
DWR not only reated the risk that the transfers could
proceed without an evaluation of their hydrological,
environmental, and economic consequences. The
Department also dealt with the transfers in a manner
that threatened to undermine public confidence in the
efficacy of the laws that are designed to guarantee the
consideration of third-party interests before water is
transferred from one region to another.
Before turning to the analysis of how these interests in fact were represented during the administration
of the Water Bank. two countervailing factors must be
noted. First. if DWR had consistently characterized the
groundwater replacement transfers as involving
"groundwater." it is not at all clear that section 1220
would have barred the transfers. Yolo County had not
enacted a groundwater management plan, and section
1220 would preclude the transfer of groundwater out of
the county only if the statute were construed to apply
even in the absence of a groundwater management
plan. While this would be a plausible reading of section 1220. it is not the most persuasive interpretation.
The purpose of section 1220 was to grant counties the
power to regulate the extraction and export of groundwater. There is no indication that the Legislature
intended to bar all groundwater exports until the
counties choose to regulate. indeed, interpreting section 1220 as precluding all groundwater transfers
pending the enactment of a groundwater management
plan would permit the counties to frustrate through
inaction implementation of the other state transfer
laws. which uniformly encourage transfers as a means
of supplying water deficient areas of the state.
Accordingly. if DWR had acknowledged the potential
applicability of section 1220. it could have found the
statute to be ambiguous and therefore reached the
legally defensible conclusion that the law is inapplicable until the counties exercise the regulatory powers
granted to them by the legislation. 9 4
Second. notwithstanding the decision to charac-

188. Id.. Telephone interview with Walter Pettit. Executive Director
of the State Water Resources Control Board (Aug 14. 1992)
189. Telephone interview with Andrew H Sawyer. Assistant Chief
Counsel to the State Water Resources Control Board (Sept 14. 1993)]

19Z Telephone Inlntee with Andrew H Sawy"er..Assistant Chief
Counsel to the State Water Resources Control Board (Mar. I. 1993}.

190. Id.
191. The Board subsequently focused on the question presented
by § 1220 in its informal review of the water purchase contracts between
DWR and the Yuba County Water Agency Telephone Interview with
Andrew H. Sawyer. Assistant Chief Counsel to the State Water Resources
Control Board (Sept 14. 19931

192 Telephone Interview with Andrew It Sawyer. Assistant chief
193 Ser CAL WATECoe 4 275 (West Supp 1994}

194 As noted In the text. the Board disputes this construction of
§ 1220 According to Its Assistant Chief Counsel. the Board Interprets §
1220 as prohibiting all exports of groundwater from protected areas until
a county groundwater management plan is adopted Telephone interview with Andrew H Saw*yer. Assstant Chief Counsel to the State Water
Resources Control Board (Mar I. IM933
In any event, the questions whether groundwater replacement
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terize the nature of the water transferred for the purpose of avoiding both the Board's jurisdiction over
surface water transfers and the arguable statutory bar
on groundwater exports, the administrators of the
Water Bank were uniformly praised for their willingness to listen to claims that particular transfers to the
Bank might adversely affect third-party interests.' 95
Moreover, the Department of Water Resources took
some actions that were not required by the governing
law to consider the effects of certain transfers on both
groundwater and the environment and to compensate
(at least partially) for potential harm to local
economies'9
F. Consideration and Protection
of Third-Party Interests
The removal of all transfers from Yolo and Solano
Counties from the supervisory jurisdiction of the State
Water Resources Control Board nevertheless eliminated all formal legal means of assessing third-party
effects. As one observer commented, because the
Department of Water Resources never established a
"process to invite public participation and comment,"
the transfers remained essentially "private contracts
between the transferors and the Water Bank." 97 It is in

this light then that the question of how the administrators of the Water Bank considered, and took steps to
mitigate harm to, third-party interests must be analyzed.
Interestingly, there is no evidence that non-participating surface water rights holders objected to any
transfer associated with the Water Bank or criticized
DWR for failing to protect their rights. Rather, the
interviews conducted for this study identified three
areas of strong concern about third-party effects.
transfers must be treated as transfers of groundwater for purposes of §
1220 and, Ifso. whether § 1220 prohibits export transfers in the absence
of a county groundwater management plan have been put to rest by
Assembly Bill 2897, enacted in 1992 A.B 2897. 1992 CAL STAT.
CH.481, §
I. This statute provides.
A water user that transfers surface water pursuant to 1§
1745.041 may not replace that water with groundwater
unless the groundwater use Is either of the following:
(a) Consistent with a groundwater management
plan adopted pursuant to state law for the
affected area.
(bJ Approved by the water supplier from whose
service area the water is to be transferred and
that water supplier, if a groundwater management plan has not been adopted, determines
the transfer will not create, or contribute to,
conditions of long-term overdraft in the affected
groundwater basin.
CAL VATER
CODE § 1745.10 (West Supp. 1994). The new law does not
apply to transfers of 'previously recharged groundwater from an overdrafted groundwater basin" or to the "replacement of transferred surface
water with groundwater previously recharged into an overdrafted
groundwater basin, if the recharge was part of a groundwater banking
operation." Id.§ 1745.11. Notwithstanding the limitations on groundwater replacement transfers, DWR supported this legislation. Letter from
Steve Macaulay. Manager of the Drought Water Bank. California
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These were: (1) the effects of the groundwater replacement transfers on local groundwater resources, (2) the
consequences of the land fallowing contracts on fish
and wildlife: and (3) the unaccounted costs of Water
Bank operations on the economies of the areas from
which the water was transferred.

I. Groundwater Overdraft and Land Subsidence
The strongest criticism of the Water Bank Is the
claim raised by the Yolo County Board of Supervisors
and the Yolo County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District that the Department of Water
Resources did not adequately evaluate the effects of
the groundwater substitution transfers on the groundwater resources of Yolo County. These officials are
concerned that the increased pumping of groundwater
required to replace the transfer of surface water from
the Yolo Bypass area of the county caused both overdraft of the aquifer and subsidence in adjacent areas,
Before considering this claim, it is necessary to digress
briefly to consider the hydrology of Yolo County.
Irrigated agriculture dominates water use In Yolo
County, accounting for ninety-six percent of the
applied water use. Municipal and industrial userslocated principally in the cities of Davis, Woodland,
and Winters-take the balance. 198 Although many
users have access to both surface water and groundwater, large parts of the county rely exclusively on
groundwater 99 These areas include the Yolo-Zamora
Water District, lands along the eastern edge of the
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation
District, and the cities of Davis and Woodland20D
During normal water supply conditions, water
users in Yolo County receive approximately fifty-five
percent of their supplies from surface water sourcesDepartment of Water Resources (Jan. 6, 1993)
195. Telephone interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management
Coordinator of the California Department of Fish and Game (Aug 17,
1992; Telephone Interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors (Aug 14, 1992), Telephone Interview with
Judith Redmond, California Action Network (Aug 12, 1992)
196. See infra part II.F.
197. Telephone interview with Judith Redmond, California Action
Network (Aug. 12, 1992)
'
198, MIMI JENKINS,
YOLO COUNTY,
CALIFORNLW'S
WATER
SUPPLY
SYSTEM

CONIUNcTrvE USE WrrmouT MANAGE.MENT
12-13 (1992) Iherelnafter
REPoTl.

JENKINS

199. There are two hydrologically distinct aquifers In Yolo County
a shallow to Intermediate depth aquifer, which Is located within 700 feet
of the surface of the overlying land, and a deep aquifer, the level of which
Is greater than 1.000 feet in depth. Id.at 17 Although the deep aquifer Is
used by the University of California at Davis, It Is not considered to be a
significant or reliable source of supply for the county Id.,The shallow to
intermediate depth aquifer Is located In the eastern and south-central
parts of the county. Western and north-central Yolo County have no
groundwater reserves. Id,at 6, 17,
200, YoLo CouNT?, WATER
PLAN
UPDATE
19 (1992) (draft) Iherelnafter
DRFAiWATER
PLANUPDATEI.
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Cache Creek, Putah Creek. and the Sacramento Riverand about forty-five percent from groundwater20i -in
drought years. agricultural groundwater use increases
as more groundwater is pumped by farmers to make
" 02
up for shortfalls in rain and surface water supplies 2
Because recharge from rainfall and other surface water
sources also is reduced during drought conditions.
this increased pumping will cause the groundwater
table to drop. It has been estimated that net groundwater depletion during 1991 was approximately
140.000 acre-feet.2 03 Of this amount. 47.800 acre-feet
(or thirty-six percent) has been attributed to the fallowing and groundwater substitution transfers to the
1991 Water Bank 2 04 These transfers totaled 96.900 and
57.400 acre-feet, respectively.2 0'
The groundwater substitution transfers were concentrated in and along the Yolo Bypass in the eastern
portion of the County.206 The additional groundwater
withdrawal required to replace the surface supplies
sold to the Water Bank was controversial for two reasons. First, although most of the lands involved In the
groundwater replacement transfers are outside the
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation
District, the groundwater generally moves within the
basin from west to east toward the area in which most
of the additional pumping occurred 2 07 As a consequence, the District believed that the increased
groundwater extraction associated with the Water
Bank would diminish the groundwater supplies available to its members.20 8Second. the adjacent area west

R31,12he md th (clumu&i
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of the lands that were involved in the groundwater
replacement transfers has experienced groundwater
overdraft over the past forty years.2 as well as land
subsidence of between four and six feet.21o Both the

Yolo County Board of Supervisors and the Yolo County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District
believed that the groundwater substitution transfers
would exacerbate the overdraft of the aquifer and pose
a significant risk of contributing to further land subsi2
dence. 11
Four actiofis were taken to address these concerns. First. DWR required each participant in the
groundwater replacement transfers to install -totalizing flowmeters" on the discharge of each of the seller's
wells.212 Second. the Yolo County Board of Supervisors

entered into a memorandum of understanding with
the Conaway Conservancy---one of the largest groundwater replacement transferors-which required it to
establish -a program to monitor the behavior of
groundwater in the vicinity' of its wells.2 t3 DWR induded similar requirements in its contracts with the other
groundwater replacement transferors and agreed to
reimburse the sellers for 50 percent of their monitoring
expenses up to a fixed limit.2 14 Third. under threat of

litigation, the Board of Supervisors persuaded each
participating seller to limit the amount of groundwater
that could be pumped as a substitute for transferred
surface water to the sellers maximum annual use during the ten preceding years as measured by existing
well records.2 " Fourth. the Board of Supervisors

201. Id.at 13

lion in the area D rr WA= Pt~ UmAT. supra note 200. at 30

202. lsrrrlNs REPORT.
supra note 198. at 21

211 Telephone Interviex with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Superisors (Aug 14. 1992. Telephone interview with
lames F Eagan. General Manager of the Yole County Food Control and
Water Conservation District (Aug 14. 1992). UC CoNrER-,c' REPOR.
supra note 126. at 21 (comments of lames F Eagan) DWR partially dtsputes this contention According to the Department. while

203. U.C. CONFERENCE REPoRT.
supra note 126. at 19 Another study
estimates that. under surface water supply conditions comparable to
1991 but without the benefit of the March rains, a total of 760,100 acrefeet of groundwater would have to be pumped to maintain 1990 irrigation levels. This would represent a seventy-four percent Increase over
the average annual groundwater extractions of 436.100 acre-feet IENE.ms
REPoxr, supra note 198, at 23
204. U.C. CONFEvRNcE REPORT.
supra note 126, at 19
205. Id. at 18
206. CAuFoRrwA DEPArmtENT OF WATERREsouRcEs. STATEDvou:;HT
WATER BANK.PROGPAENVIRON.MENTAL
IMPAc"REPORT121(1993) Ihere-

inafter -/ATERBANKEIR-I
207. JErNs REPORT.
supra note 198. at 29
208. Telephone interview with lames F Eagan. General Manager of
the Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug 14.
1992). DWR also has concluded that pumping In the Yolo Bypass area
has formed a cone of depression, which both Increases the west-to-east
movement of groundwater down gradient and causes groundwater to
flow west from the Sacramento River into the area of the Increased
extraction. A 1992 test indicated that approximately 30 percent of the
water pumped from these wells may be from seepage from the
Sacramento River WATER BANKEIR. supra note 206. at 122
209. lJErNms REPoRT. supra note 198. at 33-34 The overdraft in this
area has occurred over the 40-year period In any given year. of course.
the groundwater table may rise and fall. depending variations in the
level of pumping and recharge from both surface and subsurface
sources, SeeDRAFTWATERPLANUPDATE.sUpra note 200. at 22-27
210. Id; WATER
BANK EIR. supra note 206. at 115 There is some evidence that the subsidence also has been caused by natural gas extrac-

lilt is true that there is possible subsidence in this
area, actual subsidence has only been confirmed in the
Yo!D-Zamora area some distance to the north and west
There does not appear to be long-term c;erdraft in the
woodland-Da-ds area, although there are substantial water
level depressions due to continual pumping for urban use
The concern is not owverdraft. rather, it is the threat of future
subsidence due to water lervels falling below their historical
le;els
Letter Irom Robert G Potter. Chief Deputy Director of the Califomia
Department of Water Resources 2 ISept 8. 1993) (on file with author).
212 Si eq. Contract Betwe en the California DepartmentofWater
Resources and the Cona'xay Consenrancy Group for 1991 Emergency
Drought Water Supply. Exhib:t C (Apr 9. 19911 Ihereinafter Conaway
Contractllon file with author)
213 Sir eq . Yo!o County Board of Supervisors. Agreement No 9133. Memorandum of Understanding. in Conavay Contract. supra note
212. Exhibit D. at 3
214 IU at 9. Letter from RobertG Potter. Chief Deputy Directorof
the California Department of Water Resources 2 ISepL 8, 1993) (on file
with author)
215 Yolo County Board of Supervisors. Agreement No- 91-33,
Memorandum of UnderstandinG. in Cona-ay Contract. supra note 212.
Exhibit D.at 3
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imposed a two percent gross receipts charge on the
revenue received by the seller from the water transferred to the Water Bank. 216 DWR agreed to
reimburse
217
the seller's costs of paying this surcharge.
Notwithstanding the great concern about the
groundwater replacement transfers, there is no evidence that the additional groundwater pumping either
has caused land subsidence or has significantly lowered well levels in up-gradient portions of the basin.
University of California researchers have stated that
it is not possible at this time to establish the
degree of subsidence resulting from the water
bank. Field measurements are essential but
the instrumentation has not been in place
long enough to allow quantification. Thus,
the conclusion at this time is limited to concern about subsidence-concern for protection of levees, for example, and drainage
218
canal slopes.
DWR has concluded more categorically that "Inlo
significant adverse impacts were detected in Yolo
County during 1991 as a result of pumping for the
water bank," and that subsequent monitoring has not
contradicted this conclusion. 219 Indeed, even Yolo
County officials agree that there is no firm evidence
that the 1991 and 1992 Water Bank transfers caused
any irreparable harm to the structure of the aquifer or
220
to other County interests.
These past transfers are not the county's primary
concern, however. Rather, County officials fear that
DWR has targeted the Yolo Bypass area as a principal
source of supply for future water banks and for transfers to individual purchasers in the urban areas of the
state.221 They believe that all of the water presently
available to Yolo County will be needed within the
County to supply future demands and are concerned
that DWR does not understand the effects of surface
water and groundwater exports on the groundwater
hydrology. 222 As described by the Chairwoman of the

Board of Supervisors, the measures adopted by the
County and DWR in 1991 were at best temporary protections that did not "speak at all to the subsidence
216. Id. The county pledged to use this revenue "solely to fund
activities In Implementing the County's Water Plan and to integrate local
water resources of Ithe sellerl and others for the long-term benefits of
[the sellerl. , the local community and the County.- Id.
217 See,e.g., Conaway Contract, supra note 212, at 9.
218. U.C. CONFERENCE
REPORT.
supra note 126, at 20-21.
219. WATERBANKEIR, supra note 206, at 122.
220. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 19921; Telephone interview with
James F. Eagan, General Manager of the Yolo County Flood Control and
Vater Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992).
221. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand. Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14. 1992); Telephone interview with
James F. Eagan. General Manager of the Yolo County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District (Aug. 14. 1992).

issue.... The problem was that DWR had no long-range
223

plan to address third-party impacts."

In view of these concerns, it is surprising that the
Yolo County Board of Supervisors did not attempt to
exercise the authority granted to it by section 1220 of
the Water Code to enact a groundwater management
plan. 224 Such a plan might limit the pumping of

groundwater to the sustainable yield of the aquifer or
prohibit the use of groundwater substitution contracts
unless the extractor could prove that the increased
pumping would'not overdraft the aquifer or cause subsidence. The General Manager of the Yolo County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District
explained that it had been impossible even to obtain a
consensus on the draft Yolo County Water Plan
Update-a document that is without binding legal
consequence-and that placing restrictions on the use
of a presently unregulated resource would be even
more difficult.2 2' indeed, according to the Chairwoman

of the Board of Supervisors, many farmers In Yolo
County seem to fear the creation of a local groundwater management agency even more than they worry
226
about the effects of future groundwater exports,
In any event, the Department of Water Resource's
decision to characterize all of the groundwater replacement transfers as "surface water transfers," and therefore to exempt them from section 1220, pretermitted
this strategy. Yet, given the State Water Resources
Control Board's interpretation of section 1220 as
applying of its own force, even in the absence of a
county groundwater management plan, 227 it is odd that

Yolo County did not challenge DWR's characterization
and try to use the statute to bar the groundwater
replacement transfers.
For the future, Yolo County may take some comfort in DWR's preparation of an environmental impact
report on the Water Bank. Yet, the report Is short on
specific protections for Yolo county and other areas
concerned about groundwater exports. It describes the
"intense level of monitoring" conducted in the Yolo
Bypass area during the 1991 and 1992 Water Banks and
states that "the results of this monitoring program will
provide the basis for evaluating the effects of future
pumping in the area." 228 The report notes, however,
222. Telephone Interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 19921, Telephone Interview with
James F. Eagan, General Manager of the Yolo County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992)
223. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 19921
224. Seesupra text accompanying note 186,
225. Telephone Interview with James F. Eagan, General Manager of
the Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug 14,
1992).
226. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors (Aug, 14, 1992)
227. Seesupra note 194,
228.

WATER
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that the Yolo County monitoring "is considered dose
to maximum in terms of potential concerns to be
addressed and the significance of potential impacts'
and concludes that -no significant adverse effects were
detected in Yolo County' from either the 1991 or the
1992 Water Bank.

229

Nor is Yolo County likely to find much solace in
AB 2897. which the Legislature enacted in 1992 In
response to the problems presented by the groundwa3 0
The Water Code now proter replacement transfers23
hibits groundwater replacement transfers unless the
groundwater use associated with the transfer is consistent with an adopted county groundwater management plan or. in the absence of such a plan, is
"lalpproved by the water supplier from whose service
area the water is to be transferred" based on the supplier's determination that the transfer 'will not create.
or contribute to, conditions of long-term overdraft in
the affected groundwater basin."231 Until Yolo County
adopts a groundwater management plan. this statute
clearly grants local water suppliers such as the Yolo
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
authority to block the transfer of groundwater or surface water for which groundwater is substituted. The
problem for the County. however, is that virtually all of
the groundwater replacement transfers to the 1991
Water Bank, as well as most of the potential future
groundwater replacement transfers that County officials fear, were made by water users that do not receive
water from a local water supplier. Rather, the transfers
from the Yolo Bypass area were made predominantly
by CVP contractors whose land is outside the boundaries of the local water agencies. Consequently. unless
or until Yolo County enacts a groundwater management plan, the County and the various local agencies
that supply water within the county will have to look to
the Bureau of Reclamation to represent their interests
232
under the new legislation.
2. Fish and Wildlife Protection
A number of concerns also were raised about the
effects of Water Bank operations on fish and wildlife.
The transfers associated with the Water Bank had three
principal environmental effects in the areas from
which water was transferred.
First, the alteration in releases from upstream
reservoirs, the movement of additional water across
the Delta, and the attendant increase in pumping from
the CVP and SWP facilities in the south Delta posed a
229. Id.at 122.
230. Sae supra note 194.
231. CAL WATER
CoDE § 1745 10 (West Supp 1994)
232. The CVP Improvement Act of 1992 does require the Bureau to
protect groundwater resources In areas from which It authorizes the
transfer of proiect water. Section 3405(a](1)(1) of the Act stipulates that
the Bureau may not approve a transfer that would create 'significant
long-term adverse impactisl on groundwater conditions In the transferor's service area.' The CVP Improvement Act of 1992. Pub. L No. 102575. § 3405(a1[(I{fl. 106 STAT.
4706 (1992). For an analysis of the water
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variety of threats to several species of fish in the
Sacramento River basin and in the Delta. These included Increases in water temperature and salinity above
the levels required for spawning and survival of eggs
and larvae, alteration of flows needed for out-migration of juvenile anadromous fish. and entrainment of
fish at the Tracy and Banks pumping plants. The
species of greatest concern were Chinook salmon,
striped bass. American shad. and the Delta smelt.2m
Second. the fallowing of land in the lower
Sacramento River and in the Delta reduced feed grain
and nesting habitat for wildlife and waterfowl. As DWR
has noted.
Fallowing of cereal grain crops (com. rice.
wheat, and barley) has a high potential for
wildlife impacts. Waste grain in harvested
fields provides a substantial portion of seasonal food requirements for both migrating
and resident wildlife.... Removal of vegetative cover severely restricts the density and
diversity of wildlife species present. 2- i
In addition, fallowing may reduce the food supply
in the immediate region available for migratory waterfowl. -Consequences range from reduced bird weight
before migration back to nesting areas, to increased
pressure on surrounding farmlands with either higher
bird populations, increased crop losses, or both.' 2 '
Third. the transfers associated with the Water
Bank-and the consequent changes in impoundments, diversions, and cropping patterns-had some
beneficial effects on fish and wildlife. DWR has
observed, for example, that the
Iclapture of luvenile fish in unscreened
pumps and diversions in the Delta and
Sacramento River were reduced since water
diversions to farmland were reduced under
fallowing contracts. Fallowing lands also provided the opportunity to retain more water in
reservoirs until later in the season, helping to
cool river temperatures to the benefit of
salmon. The reduction of irrigated acreage
also reduced salts and chemical loading during a prolonged period of low river flows. 6
The Department of Fish and Game Ihereinafter
'DFG'l agrees with this assessment.2n
transfer proislons of the CvP Imprmement Act. rec Gray. T"c Mdedrn Era
in Ca!t'n. Wour Lar. supra note I at 273-78
233 Su DAT Rzr.
Memorandum. supra note 92
234
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supra note 8. at 10-I1; Fish Impact

BA'.t EI. su;ra note 206. at 142-

235 11 at 9
236 1992 DWR R~p,sr. supra nmote 7. at 18
237 Telephone Interview %ith Dick Daniel. Water Management
Coordinator of the Caifomia Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 17.
1992)
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DFG was not involved in the negotiation of either
the contracts to purchase water for the Water Bank or
the contracts to sell water acquired by the Bank.
Rather, the contracts were "solicited, negotiated, and
signed before anyone on the 'outside' was able to participate."238 On March 1, 1991, however, DWR advised
the Board that, to "maximize water quality improvements and minimize the impact of increased exports,"
it would "work closely with the Department of Fish and
Game and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to optimize the scheduling of 'water bank' and other water
transfers."239 The Board directed DWR to conduct an
analysis of the effects of Water Bank transfers on the
240
fisheries of the Sacramento River and Delta systems.
Based on this study, DWR made a variety of changes in
planned Water Bank operations to reduce the effects of
the transfers on Chinook salmon in the Sacramento
River and on striped bass, American shad, and Delta
smelt populations in the Delta. 241 DFG helped to conduct this analysis and concurred in the administrative
changes implemented by DWR. Indeed, the Water
Management Coordinator for DFG has stated that the
administrators of the Water Bank "made a sincere
effort to work with Fish and Game and to mitigate envi242
ronmental impacts."
Post hoc participation in the mitigation of harm to
fisheries is not an adequate substitute, however, for
involvement in the decision ab initio to enter into particular transfer contracts. The adverse environmental
effects from some transfers may be impossible to mitigate fully. More importantly, the cumulative effects
from the aggregation of all of the transfers that comprise the Water Bank will inevitably limit the mitigation measures that DFG may recommend or that DWR
may impose. Mitigation measures-such as reservoir
reoperation and delayed Delta pumping-that would

render it impossible to fulfill the purchase contracts,
for example, could not be undertaken without breaching those contracts.

243

In response to these types of

concerns, the Water Management Coordinator for DFG
sat on the "Water Purchase Committee" of the 1992

Water Bank.2 44 This gave DFG the opportunity to cri-

tique the transfer proposals before the contracts were
signed and to recommend mitigation measures that
could be written into the purchase and sales contracts,
Even with this opportunity for early participation,
however, two pioblems remain. First, other interested
parties-such as private fishing organizations, local
governmental officials, and environmental organizations-do not have a formal opportunity to comment
on the transfer proposals until they become faits accompli. In contrast, if the transfers were subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, that agency would make an Independent evaluation of the potential harms caused by
the changes in storage, diversion, and use and would
be required to conduct a public hearing on the proposals if it were unable unilaterally to determine that
the transfers would not unreasonably affect fish,
wildlife, and other instream beneficial uses.245 Second,
although DWR and DFG addressed the question of
fisheries protection, no agency developed a firm
understanding of the effects of the Water Bank transfers on migratory waterfowl. DFG's Water Management
Coordinator reported that the fallowing of land In the
Delta and lower Sacramento River to generate water
for sale to the Water Bank "had undetermined effects
on water fowl from lost grain and lost habitat."2416 DFG

also found evidence of nesting failures from lack of
brood water and cover and observed a shift In geese
migration, with many birds moving north earlier in the
year than normal. 247 Despite these observations, there
was no systematic evaluation of the effects of land fal-

238. Id.

deliveries to Water Bank customers in the San Joaquin Valley and
Southern California were made from water stored In San Luis Reservoir
DWR then replaced the water in San Luis Reservoir "inSeptember and
EFFEcTOF TEMPoRARY
MODIFCATIONS OFWATER
RIGHT
PERSMrs 9 (1991). DWR
October when it could be moved through the Delta with minimum
submitted this document to the Board In conjunction with a joint petieffects on fisheries. In addition, a portion of the water was held In reser.
tion filed by the Department and the Bureau of Reclamation temporarivoirs north of the Delta as carryover storage, reducing exports during
ly to amend the permits for the SWP and the CVP (I) to add Clifton Court
1991. Id.at It.
Forebay as a point of diversion for the CVP. and (2) to increase the 28day running average of mean daily chloride concentrations at three
242. Telephone Interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management
points In the Delta to 300 mg/L. CAUFORNIA
STATE
WATER
RESOURCES Coordinator. California Department of Fish and Game (Aug 17, 1992J.
CONTROL BOARD, NOTICE OF EMERGENCYHEARINGAND BOARD MEETING:
243. This would not be true, however, Ifthe decision to alter the
CONSIDERATION
or DROUGHT-RELATED EMERGENCY
WATERRIGHT
ORDER AND
purchase contracts was made on the basis of an existing legal directive
RELATED
ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO A REOUEST
FORA HEARING
FRO.Mi
THE
to protect the environment oran endangered species In such a case, the
DEPARDENT OF WATER RESOURCES (1991). As noted above, the parties subexisting law, be it the Endangered Species Act, the public trust doctrine,
sequently withdrew the petition. Seesupra text accompanying notes 89or the Delta water quality standards established under the Porter90.
Cologne and Clean Water Acts. would take precedence over the con240. 1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. Fish Impacts Memo,
tracts. SeeUnited States v. State Water Resources Control Bd, 182 Cal,
supra note 92.
App. 3d 82. 145-48 fist Dist. 1986).
241. 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra note 7, at 10-Il. For example, DWR
244. Interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management Coordinator
asked the Bureau of Reclamation to retain in Shasta Reservoir water purof the California Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 17, 1992)
chased by the Bank from cVP contractors for later release when the
239. CAuFORNIA
DEPARIENT OFWATERRESOURCES.
DELTAPROTECTIONS:

water would help to maintain temperature levels needed for spawning
winter-run Chinook salmon. The Department deferred pumping from the
south Delta that had been scheduled for May and June 'to minimize
Impacts on striped bass eggs and larvae." Id. at 10. It also limited Delta
exports during July and August to reduce entrainment of American shad.
striped bass, and Delta smelt. Previously scheduled spring and summer

245. CAL WATER
CODE § 1727 (West Supp. 1994); scesupra note 140,

246. Telephone interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management
Coordinator of the California Department of Fish and Game (Aug 17,
1992).
247. Id.
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lowing and other cropping changes on wildlife and
248
waterfowl.
The solution to these problems is not to subject
all future Water Bank transfers to review by the State
Water Resources Control Board. During times of
severe drought and localized water shortage emergencies, state officials and participating buyers and sellers
must act swiftly to sign contracts and to move the
water through the Bank. In this context, even the expedited procedures of the Temporary Change provisions
of the Water Code 249 could delay the necessary environmental review and Board approval until it is too
late to supply water for pre-irrigation. planting, or supply of withering row crops and orchards. Rather, what
is needed is pre-emergency evaluation of environmental and other third-party effects of potential transfers.
The outline of this a priori review is the subject of Part
Ill of this article.
3. Reimbursement of Social Welfare Costs
The third criticism of the Water Bank also arose
out of the land fallowing contracts. On January 7. 1992.
the Yolo County Board of Supervisors submitted a
$129,305.00 bill to the Department of Water Resources
for reimbursement of the County's additional expenditures for General Assistance and Aid to Families With
Dependent Children allegedly caused by the increase
in unemployment attributable to land fallowing and
the transfer of water to the 1991 Water Bank The Board
of Supervisors estimated that the fallowing of 40.200
acres in Yolo County decreased the demand for agricultural labor, services, and supplies within the County
and consequently put 450 persons out of work The
unemployed workers then made claims for general
assistance and AFDC entitlements, which in turn
increased the County's social services costs by
$129.305.00.250
DWR responded with a detailed letter that challenged both the legality of the County's claim and the
facts on which the claim was premised. It agreed "that
'third party impacts' need to be addressed and that
local economic impacts resulting from substantial
unanticipated land fallowing can be significant." but
stated that Governor Wilson's "forthcoming water program" would be the appropriate forum in which to
address these issues.25' DWR then declared that it was
248. In part as a response to these problems associated with land
fallowing. however. DWR did not enter Into any fallowing contracts for
the 1992 Water Bank. Letter from Robert G Potter. Chief Deputy Director
of the California Department of Water Resources 4 (Sept 8. 1993) (on file
with author).
249. Seesupra notes 139-40 and accompanying text
250. Letter from George P DeMars. Chair of the Yolo County Board
of Supervisors. to David N Kennedy. Director of the California
Department of Water Resources I (lan 7. 1992) (on file with author)
25 1. Letter from Robert G Potter. Deputy Director of the California
Department of Water Resources. to BetsyA Marchand. Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors I Mar 10. 1992) (on file with author)
252 Id
253. Id at 2

unaware of "any legal basis for the Department to
reimburse a county for such costs in the absence of a
contractual provision or statute authorizing it to do
so_"252 Finally. it contested the County's assessment of
the additional, unreimbursed social welfare costs that
were attributable to the fallowing contracts.
First. DWR observed that "much of the 'fallowed'
acreage in Yolo County was wheat, pasture and alfalfa,
where the farmers agreed not to irrigate the crops that
were already In the ground. We have been told by farmers that in many cases full or substantial crops were
still harvested on these lands.... Since wheat farmers
were presumably able to use full (or nearly full) labor
inputs, such arrangements may have resulted in a net
increase to County revenues and little impact to
County services."2 Second. DWR asked, "What happened to farm laborers who would have farmed lands
that were fallowed?" Challenging the County's implication that all such workers applied for general assistance. the Department stated that at least some of
these farm workers "remained employed and were put
to work on deferred maintenance projects and other
tasks. -"5 Third. DWR suggested that the farmers who
fallowed their lands might well have spent some of the
income received from the Water Bank in Yolo County
and argued that the County would receive additional
21
tax receipts from the farmers' increased revenues.
Fourth. the Department noted that "Imlore than
S600.000 was spent locally in developing the extensive
ground water monitoring program in the Yolo Bypass.
In addition, we have provided more than $100,000
directly to Yolo County to continue work on local water
resource planning efforts. Presumably this money was
all spent In the local area."-"
DVR advised the Board of Supervisors that to
proceed with the request for reimbursement it would
have to make a claim to the State Board of Control.257
Yolo County subsequently filed a reimbursement
claim, which the Board of Control denied in 1993.253
According to the Chairwoman of the Board of
Supervisors. "going to the State Board of Control is like
going to a bottomless pit, also, this was a new type of
claim. It would have cost us more than $129,000 to
develop the information they wanted in order to submit a new claim This isn't fair. folks.7"s
Fairness aside for the moment. DWRs rejection of
254 1d
255 L1at 2-3
256 1. at 3, !a.supratext accompanying notes 216-17
257 Letterfrom RobertG Potter. Deputy Directorof the California
Department of Water Resources. to Betsy A Marchand. Chair of the Yolao
County Board of Supervisors (/ar t0, IM92) ton file with authorl.
258 Telephone interview- with Charles Mack. Ylo County Counsel
[Sept 13. 19931
259 U C Co:.nr-m.. Rc.. r, su;ra note 126. at 39 (comments of
Betsy A Marchand) Notwiths!anding these concerns. Yolo County submitted its claim to the Board olControl In Decemberof 1992 Letter from
Robert G Potter. Chief Deputy Director of the California Department of
Water Resources 4 (Sept 8, 1993, (on file with authori
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the claim was clearly the appropriate response. As the
Department itself emphasized, there is no legal basis
(apart from a contract) for a county or any other local
agency to seek reimbursement for lost revenues or
increased expenses caused by water transfers out of
the area. Water Code section 386 stipulates that transfers of water made available by conservation or land
fallowing may not "unreasonably affect the overall
economy of the area from which the water is being
transferred." 26 D But this statute is applicable only to
transfers of "surplus" water that are subject to the
State Water Resources Control Board's jurisdiction
under Water Code sections 380-387. As discussed previously, the Board did not have jurisdiction over any of
the transfers from Yolo County.2 6 1 Moreover, even if
section 386 were applicable, neither it nor any other
provision of California law authorizes DWR to reimburse counties for the economic consequences of
water transfers that "unreasonably affect" the local
economy.
As with most of the other issues analyzed in this
paper, however, the legal resolution of the dispute for
purposes of the 1991 Water Bank does not put the controversy to rest. Yolo County fears that the 1991 Water
Bank was a portent of future efforts by DWR to use the
Sacramento River basin generally, and Yolo County in
particular, as a permanent source of additional water
supply for the growing urban areas of the state.2 62 DWR
acknowledged at the time that further study is needed
"so that we can develop a future program that can best
minimize any adverse impacts." 263 Since then, it has
taken two steps to reduce the economic disruption
and social costs of transfers associated with the Water
Bank. In 1992, the Bank purchased no water made
available by land fallowing.2 64 And, in the EIR that the
Department has prepared to evaluate the drought
water bank program, it has proposed to acquire water
through fallowing contracts generally, as a last priority
after puchasing surplus water and surface water made
available by groundwater substitution. 265
The questions raised by Yolo County's reimbursement request are fundamental ones that must be grappled with, if not resolved, before future water banks
may be created: To what extent should our laws accord
local communities collective rights to their existing
water supplies, and how should those communal
rights be balanced against the claims of the market?
The existence of these questions, and the deeply felt
and widely shared view among California's rural communities that water is an endowment, is one of the
260. CAL. WATER
CODE§ 386 (West Supp 1994).
261. Seesupra part IIB.
262. UC.CONFERENcE REPOrT. supra note 126, at 39 (comments of
Betsy A. Marchand); Telephone interview with Betsy A. Marchand, Chair
of the Yolo County Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14. 1993).
263. Letter from Robert G. Potter. Deputy Director of the California
Department of Water Resources, to Betsy A Marchand. Chair of the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors (Mar. 10,1992) (on file with author).

enduring lessons of the 1991 Water Bank,
I11.Five Lessons for Future Water Banks
Despite the jurisdictional criticisms and the concerns
over third-party interests, the first lesson of the state's
experience with water banking is that transfers can
play a crucial role in providing supplemental supplies
to water-short regions in times of drought. Moreover,
at least with the extraordinary efforts of state, federal,
and local water administrators, this reallocation can
occur quickly and with some consideration of the
effects of Water Bank operations on the environment
and on the local areas from which water is exported.
The events of the 1991 Water Bank also demonstrate, however, that the good faith of individual
administrators is not an adequate substitute for formal and systematic protections of third-party Interests. As described above, transactions were manipulated to avoid review by the State Water Resources
Control Board and some transfers were authorized
without an understanding of their effects on the
region's groundwater resources, on instream flows,
and on fish and wildlife habitat. The second lesson of
the 1991 Water Bank therefore is that the state must
establish a comprehensive and consistent process for
the consideration of third-party interests that are
potentially affected by water transfers, or by their
attendant changes in reservoir operations, groundwater and surface water management, and cropping patterns.
A first step would be to acknowledge the haphazard nature of the Board's jurisdiction over water transfers. Important matters such as the provision of notice
to the interested public, the opportunity to comment
on transfer proposals before they are approved, and
the application of formal statutory criteria for the consideration of third-party interests should not be contingent on the legal characterization of the water being
transferred. The current state of the law-under which
some transfers must be evaluated by the Board, while
others are exempt from formal review-can be
explained only by reference to history and tradition.
Changes in riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights,
transfers of groundwater, and reallocations of CVP
base supplies are exempt from the water transfer
statutes simply because the underlying water rights
were accorded "grandfathered" immunity from the
modern system of water rights regulation.266 Yet, the
264. WATER
BANK
EIR, supra note 206, at I I.
265. Id.at 4-5; seeinfra text accompanying note 278
266. When the Legislature enacted the Water Commission Act of
1913, which established the predecessor to the State Water Resources
Control Board, it exempted riparian rights and appropriations that were
commenced prior to the effective date of the statute. December 19, 1914,
from the permit and license system CAL WATER
CODE- 1201 (West 1971)
The Legislature also limited the coverage of the Act to appropriations of
water from bodies of surface water and from 'subterranean streams flow-
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fallowing of riparian land and the release of the conserved water, or the transfer of CVP base supplies
premised on pre-1914 rights and the substitution of
groundwater, can have the same effects on fish and
wildlife or groundwater resources in the area from
which the water is exported as a transfer that requires
a change in the transferor's permit or license.
While greater coherence in water rights administration is a generally desirable policy goal, the extension of the Board's jurisdiction to cover all types of
water transfers would not be an appropriate response
to this particular problem. For, as emphasized
throughout this paper, emergency drought transfers
must be negotiated and implemented quickly-usually in less than two months. If the Board had to evaluate all transfer proposals before they could become
effective, the administrative proceedings could delay
the transfers well beyond the time in which the water
is needed in the purchasing areas. This is likely to be
true even if the Board could make the findings
required by Water Code section 1727 on its own. without conducting noticed, public hearings on the transfer petitions. 267 For example, there were 351 contracts
for the sale of water to the 1991 Water Bank.268 Board
review of these contracts to determine that each transfer individually (and all transfers cumulatively) would
not injure any other legal water user under any potential hydrological condition or unreasonably affect fish.
wildlife, and other instream beneficial uses could have
dragged on through the summer and fall when the
water was most needed in the purchasing areas.
Nor is enhanced local control, such as that created by AB 2897. an adequate response to the problem
of unregulated Water Bank transfers. Counties-of-origin, local water agencies, and other water users in the
area from which groundwater or surface water is transferred have legitimate interests both in the region's
water resources and in proposals to export water to
other parts of the state. But local entities can be
expected to evaluate the costs and benefits of water
transfers from a decidedly parochial perspective.26 9
This is particularly true during periods of drought.
when other members of a local water agency, or users
with correlative rights to a groundwater basin, are likely to claim as their own water that another user proposes to make available for transfer by fallowing or
groundwater substitution. For example, the Yolo
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
strongly objected to the groundwater replacement
transfers to the 1991 Water Bank because of the poten-

tial effects of such transfers on groundwater supplies
in its service area. and it is the District's policy to
maintain all currently available supplies for use within
the county, and the District.270 Indeed, as the
Chairwoman of the Yolo County Board of Supervisors
has stated, the County -believes that water is a community resource and that we need to protect it."-M
Yet. there are other equally legitimate interests
involved in the decision whether to transfer water.
Water deficient areas of the state must have the ability--either through the market or the political and
administrative processes-to acquire emergency supplies In times of drought. And. state and federal water
officials have a responsibility that transcends local or
regional interests to ensure that domestic users,
essential economic sectors, and environmental needs
have adequate supplies. Indeed. the very idea of a
state Water Bank-which is premised on the theory
that market forces, rather than government fiat. should
determine the reallocation of water resources-belies
the notion that counties and local water agencies
should have a veto over transfers to other regions of
the state.
The market alone will not adequately represent all
of the relevant interests, however. For the parties to
the transfer contracts, even with DWR involvement.
can be expected to focus on their bilateral interestswater supply and demand, price, opportunity costs.
and contract terms-and pay scant if any attention to
the interests of the third-parties who will bear the
external costs of the transactions. As Professor Sax has
observed, the -future of water transfers will be jeopardized' unless a broader and more inclusive model is
recognized. A more appropriate model -would be a
diplomatic negotiation with a number of parties, each
with important and legitimate interests that need to
be accommodated, but without clearly defined
rights "'
Thus. there must be a governmental forum in
which all of the interests involved in the operations of
the Water Bank can be represented and evaluated.
Moreover. because of the need to respond quickly to
localized water shortages during periods of drought, it
is essential that the review and determination of thirdparty interests-and the ultimate accommodation of
the interests of all of the parties-be made expeditiously, as well as comprehensively.
Evaluation of individual transfers after the agreements between the water user and the Water Bank are
signed would fall both criteria. As noted above, with

ing through known and definite channels,' Id.§ 1200 This had the effect
of generally exempting groundwater use from the permit and license
system. SeeGray. supra note 115. at 747-48
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267. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40 and accompanying
text

270 Telephone Inteniew withlames F Eagan. General Manager of
the Yo!o county Flood Control and Water Conservation Distct faig. 14.
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268. Honrr REPoRT.
supra note 54. at 10. see supra text accompanying note 55.
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269. For an insightful and provocative analysis of the poides of
local water agendes regarding transfers to users outside their service
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hundreds of parties participating in the Water Bank, it
would be impossible for the Board, or any other
agency, to review each of the transfer contracts thoroughly to ensure that Water Bank operations will not
violate the legal protections for third-party interests,
but also quickly to allow water to be transferred to
areas of critical shortage in time to meet seasonal
demands. Moreover, sequential review of individual
transfer contracts would present the risk that the
cumulative effects of the transfers would not be adequately considered.
The Department of Water Resources has responded to this problem by preparing a "Program
Environmental Impact Report" on future drought water
banks.273 This document has many positive features.
For example, it contains a detailed analysis of the
hydrology of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and
Delta system that will help both water management
officials and the interested public to understand better
how the 1991 and 1992 Water Banks affected the competing water users, river flows, water quality, fish and
wildlife, groundwater, and land use. 274 It also describes
a range of possible "significant unavoidable impacts"
and "cumulative impacts" on surface and groundwater
supplies, water quality, fish and wildlife, and local
economies from future water bank operations. 275 The
report concludes with a discussion of an array of alternatives to water transfers-ranging from demand
reduction to construction of new facilities to desalination and weather modification-that could be used to
276
supply critical demands during future droughts.
For the most part, however, the EIR is a purely
advisory document. Although DWR states that implementation of future drought water banks will "proceed
within the range and scope of effects" set forth in the
EIR,2 77 the report is bereft of specific limitations, or
even policies, that would govern wafer transfers, reservoir operations, and water management decisions
associated with the Water Bank. For example, the
report does not define the areas from which water may
be transferred as a result of land fallowing or groundwater substitution without causing significant adverse
third-party effects. Nor does it specify the hydrologic
conditions during which water may be moved through
the Delta without posing a substantial risk to anadromous fish.
The only exceptions are statements that occur in
Chapter One of the EIR under the headings "Priority of
Implementation" and "Participant Guidelines" and in
Chapter Six under the title "Cumulative Socio273 See supra note 206 The draft EIR defines the proposed program as 'a State Drought Water Bank, a water supply augmentation program to be Implemented during periods of drought and other severe
water-short periods " WATER
BANg EIR, supra note 206, at I. The EIR covers the next five to ten years -Within the next 0 years, a subsequent
environmental analysis will be conducted to reexamine actual conditions under which the proposed program will have operated" Id.
274 WATERBANKEIR, supra note 206 at 17-148

economic Effects." These sections propose substantive
policies that define how future water banks will be
administered.
First, water would be acquired from different categories of prospective sellers based on the size of the
aggregate demand for water from the Water Bank, DWR
expressed a general preference for purchases of surplus water and water made available by groundwater
substitution. Purchase of water from land fallowing
would be the lowest priority. DWP noted, however,
that:
fallowing can be a successful source of water
without creating significant adverse impacts,
and is favored by some sellers over ground
water substitution. Therefore the future strategy will be to consider transfers on a case-bycase basis, where ground water substitution
might be the favored source in one region
while fallowing would be the preferred source
278
in another.
Second, prospective purchasers of water from the
Bank would have to satisfy the following criteria:
Municipal and industrial users would be required,
"considering prudent carryover reserves for future
years," to use all available alternative supplies and
could purchase water only "to avoid significant evironmental, economic or social loss or damages that might
279
otherwise occur if water deliveries were not made,"
Agricultural users also would have to use all available
supplies, considering prudent carryover storage
requirements, and could buy water from the Bank only
for "trees, vines, permanent crops, and other crops
where the acquired water would have a high unit
value."280 Supplies for fish and wildlife would be based
on annual criteria developed by DFG and "would
depend on the annual condition of fish and wildlife
281
populations and survival conditions."
Third, DWR is considering a variety of other strategies to minimize or to mitigate the effects of future
Water Bank transfers on the areas from which water Is
sold. These include:
o Reimbursement of county governments for
increased social welfare costs associated with
unemployment caused by land fallowing;
* Payments to county governments and local
groundwater management agencies for the
development of water management plans;
275 Id at 149-86,
276 Id. at 187-204,
277 Id at 12.
278 Id at 4-5
279, Id at 5.
280 Id
281. Id
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e Limitation on the amount of water generated by land fallowing to 20 percent of the
water that would have been applied or stored
in the absence of Water Bank transfers:
* Development of priorites for types of water
282
transfers by region:
These substantive standards are a salutary first
step toward the accommodation of third-party interests and the need for prompt action in response to
emergency water shortages. But the EIR fails to correct
the fundamental problem identified in this paper-the
absence of coherent, systematic review to ensure that
transfers associated with the Water Bank, both individually and collectively, do not create (or exacerbate)
groundwater overdraft, alter stream flows or degrade
water quality in ways that pose an undue risk to
anadromous fish, diminish food and habitat for
wildlife and waterfowl, or cause unreasonable disruptions to the local communities from which water is
exported.
What is needed instead is a comprehensive analysis of environmental, economic, and other potential
third-party effects that can serve as a guide for future
water banks. Such a document would contain legally
binding determinations of the controversies that vexed
the administrators of the 1991 Water Bank and which.
if left unresolved, would imperil the establishment and
operation of future banks. Thus. the environmental
and economic analysis would answer such questions
as:
• From what areas could additional groundwater be pumped-either for direct transfer
to the Water Bank or as replacement for surface water sold to the Water Bank-without
causing irreparable harm in the form of land
subsidence, non-rechargeable lowering of the
water table, and groundwater pollution?
* What limits and conditions should be
placed on groundwater extraction in those
areas in which it is permissible in order to
avoid or to minimize these problems?
* What restrictions should be placed on
reservoir operations, diversions, and other
matters of water rights administration, under
a variety of hydrologic conditions, to ensure
that the transfers and changes in water use
associated with the Water Bank do not
adversely affect anadromous fish. instream
flows, and water quality in the Delta and the
rivers from which the water is transferred?
* How would the Water Bank affect other
endangered or threatened species, again
under a variety of hydrologic conditions?
* In what areas could agricultural land be fal282. Id. at 185
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lowed to make water available for transfer to
the Water Bank without jeopardizing the food
supply and habitat for wildlife and waterfowl?
* How do migratory birds and other animals
respond to changes in food supply and habitat-i.e.. are there other areas to which they
could move for replacement of the areas lost
to the fallowing program?
* How much land could be fallowed in each
county that participates in the Water Bank
without unduly disrupting local economies
and without Imposing unreasonable uncompensated social services costs on local governments?
& WVhat other employment opportunities
would be available to workers displaced by
changes in farming operations associated
with the Water Bank?
Reliable answers to these and other relevant
questions will not come easily or inexpensively. But
the product of this endeavor would be well worth the
time and expense involved.
Once the analyses described above were completed. the state would have a hydrologic, economic, and
ecologic map of those regions that are likely to participate in. or be affected by, future water banks. These
areas might include Yuba County. the Sacramento
River. the Yolo Bypass. the Delta. and the west side of
the San Joaquin Valley. Transfers from these areas that
are consistent with the findings of the study would be
exempt from review by the State Water Resources
Control Board. Transfers that would violate the limitations and conditions established in the study to protect third-party interests, as well as transfers from
areas not covered by the study, would be permissible
only following public hearings and authorization by
the Board based on its decision that the transfer would
not injure third-party rights as defined by applicable
law.
An important question posed by this proposal is:
Which agency would decide whether a proposed transfer is within the scope and terms of the study? One
option would be to have DWR evaluate the transfer's
consistency vel non with the study as part of its negotiation of the purchase contracts and administration of
the Water Bank. This option has the virtue of integrated and expeditious decisionmaking. It suffers, however. from the risk that, as both the central participant in
the Water Bank transfers and the state agency with
principal responsibility for ameliorating future water
shortages. DWR might have an inordinate incentive to
resolve close cases In favor of finding an exemption
from Board review. In other words, DWR's duties as
manager of the Water Bank make it the wrong agency
to serve as guarantor of third-party rights.
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The alternative would be to place the responsibility on the Board. For all its faults, the Board's statutory charge is to be a neutral regulatory agency, and its
existing authority includes consideration and protection of fish and wildlife, water quality, and other thirdparty interests within areas-of-origin. 283 Thus, the
Board would be able to evaluate transfer proposals for
consistency with the study exclusively as a regulator,
unencumbered by potentially conflicting responsibilities for managing both the Water Bank and the state's
water resources generally.
Assignment of this jurisdiction to the Board
would require it to devise expedited procedures for
analysis of the proposed Water Bank transfers, so that
the transfers that are consistent with the study could
proceed and the water reallocated swiftly to areas of
critical demand. Moreover, the Board must be able to
make the consistency determination without conducting public hearings and without its decisions being
subject to review by the courts. This necessary limitation on public participation at the time of the transfer
decision means, however, that there must be an alternative forum in which potentially affected third-parties
and other interested members of the public can comment on and challenge the Board's analysis. The
appropriate occasion for these types of public criticism
to be heard is before the drought emergency occurs.
Accordingly, the hydrologic, economic, and ecologic
study should be promulgated as a regulation.
Because the rulemaking would implicate the overlapping jurisdiction of the Board, DWR, and the
Department of Fish and Game, these agencies could
participate jointly in the hearings and promulgation of
the Water Bank regulations. Alternatively, the Board or
DWR could act as lead agency and consult with the
other two in preparing the study. The state agencies
also should attempt to coordinate their efforts informally, or through cooperative agreement, with interested federal agencies such as the Bureau of
Reclamation, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. However the proceedings are conducted, all interested members of the
public would be invited to participate in the hearings
and would have an opportunity to comment on the
draft Water Bank rules before they become final.
Individual notice might be provided to those surface
water rights holders and groundwater users that could
be affected by the operations of the Water Bank as
authorized in the regulations. In addition, the final
rules would be subject to judicial review. To ensure
that the hydrologic, economic, and ecologic analyses
on which the rule is based remained accurate in light
283. Seesupra Part I.B,

of changing conditions and new information, the promulgating agencies should be required to revise the
regulations at least every five years,
To accomplish these changes, legislation would
be required. Some transfers that currently are subject
to full review by the Board would be governed by the
Water Bank regulations and could qualify Instead for
expedited review. Other transfers that presently may
be undertaken without the permission of any state
agency would be brought within the purview of the
new transfer procedures. 284 The protected areas legislation as applicable to transfers of groundwater would
be modified to remove local veto power over those
transfers that are consistent with the Water Bank
rules. 28' And, for the first time, the scattered and sporadic statutory protections for third-party interests
would be applicable in a consistent and comprehensive manner to all transfers associated with the Water
Bank.
On the eve of the contract negotiations for the
1991 Water Bank, an attorney who has been one of the
leading exponents of water transfers lamented: "Every
year, transfers get more difficult. You would think they
would get easier but they don't."286 In light of com-

ments such as this, the prospects of a proposal to create new regulations to govern transfers to future water
banks would appear to be inauspicious. But this brings
us to the third lesson of the 1991 Water Bank:
California has entered a new era in water marketing,
the hallmark of which is concern about third-party
interests and community rights. Unless these interests
are recognized and protected, future water banks will
be undermined. As Professor Sax has noted, however,
if the protection of third-parties and local communities is available only in the form of "extensive participation and elaborate public interest hearings... all but
the largest water transfers Iwill be rendered] uneco28 7
nomic and untimely."
In a way, it was fortunate that so few transfers to
the 1991 Water Bank were subject to review for their
possible effects on third-party interests. Yet, we were
also lucky that apparently no permanent damage was
imposed on the groundwater basin and overlying land
along the Yolo Bypass, on the fisheries of the Delta
and Sacramento River, on wildlife and migratory
waterfowl whose food and habitat was temporarily
diminished, and on the economic base of the counties
from which water was exported. 288 it would be naive to
suppose, however, that Yolo County officials, groundwater users, fish and wildlife advocates, and rural protection groups will sit by and permit future water
transfers to occur without asserting their rights under
the groundwater protection acts, the water transfer
1991, at I (quoting Paul M. Bartklewla).
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statutes. the public trust289doctrine, and the other laws
discussed in this article.
Thus, the fourth lesson of the 1991 Water Bank is
that it is not necessary to live with this type of zerosum conflict between the goals of prompt response to
drought-related water shortages and recognition of
third-party rights. Circumvention of the laws that have
been enacted to protect third-parties devalues interests that are both economically and ecologically
important and which have a long-standing basis in
California water law. 290 Yet, the existing alternatives-

formal vetoes of water transfers, such as that created
by AB 2897. or informal vetoes through administrative
delays and litigation-threaten to frustrate the fundamental purpose of the Emergency Drought Water
Bank.
The 1991 Water Bank was a bold experiment that
helped the state through its most recent water crisis
with few lasting negative consequences. Part of the
success of the project was the result of creative lawyering and a sensitivity to the interests that were exduded from the negotiation and implementation of the
transfers that formed the Water Bank. For the future.
however, informal recognition of third-party interests
will not suffice. The final lesson of the 1991 Water
Bank. then, is that equally bold and innovative legal
action is needed to accommodate both the market and
the community.
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